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This study examines the extent, drivers and the management of overcapacity in the  
South African Hake Deep Sea Trawl (HDST) fishery. The research methods were quantitatively 
based on input-based capacity measures and qualitatively based on subjective capacity measures.  
The majority of the fishing capacity that operates in the HDST fishery was brought over 
during the recent allocation of fishing rights in South Africa. The utilization of this capacity is 
limited through TAC reduction and effort control regimes. This leads to capacity under-
utilization which reduces employment and increases the costs of the HDST fishery.  Further, this 
capacity under-utilization has facilitated a slight recovery of this fishery’s target stock.  
In economic terms, there is substantial overcapacity in the HDST fishery, indicated by 
capacity under-utiization. In biological terms, there is no overcapacity in this fishery as capacity 
utilization is restricted. In social terms, however, there is inadequate fishing capacity in the 
HDST fishery as capacity under-utilization induced labour-under-utilization. Hence, the above 
management measures work in favour of the state which is concerned with the biological aspects 
of the fishery. The industry which is concerned with economic aspects faces overcapacity. 
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The present study seeks to examine overcapacity in a particular sector of the South African Hake 
fishery, i.e., the Hake Deep Sea Trawl (HDST) fishery. Recognized as the most capital intensive 
fishery, the HDST fishery is structurally and operationally the most complex among South 
African fisheries. Operationally, the HDST fishery is considered labour intensive since the 
majority of operating vessels is old and thus requires a great deal of manpower.  
1.1. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework that guided this study is briefly summarized below (See Fig.1.1). The 
study is largely based on input based-measures of capacity, corresponding to the technologists’ 
perspective in relation to the concept of fishing capacity.  
 
  
Input-based measures                                 
of fishing capacity 
 
             
 
                                                                                                                              Subjective measure 
                                                                                                                                             of fishing capacity 
Fig. 1.1. Conceptual framework, answers to typical why, what and how questions of the research 
 
1.2. Setting the Stage 
Overcapacity occurs when the fishing fleet is greater than necessary. Sabatella & Piccinetti 
(2004) associate overcapacity with fisheries which can potentially produce more due to excessive 
labour and capital. Marine and Coastal Management (MCM)  and the HDST fishing industry, 
define overcapacity as the degree to which an unrestricted fleet can fish more than its Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC)  in a given fishing season. MCM associate overcapacity with vessels but 
has not implemented any vessel restrictions hitherto, as such restrictions would contradict 
investment encouraging policies (Barkai & Bergh, 2007).  










What is overcapacity?  
What is  extent, drivers 
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In essence, the South African hake fishery management is faced with challenges such as 
overcapacity, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, by-catch and data deficiencies.  
 
1.3.1. Why Look at Overcapacity? 
This study explores overcapacity since it poses diverse incompatible impacts in fisheries that 
often become its sufferers (See Fig. 1.2). Further, the fact that overcapacity exacerbates IUU 
fishing, enhanced the enthusiasm for this study to explore overcapacity.   
 
 
                                                                
                                                                               
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Fig. 1.2. Illustration of why overcapacity is seen an issue (Adapted from Pascoe et al., 2008: 6).  
 
During the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2001, South Africa (SA) 
committed itself to achieve an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries management (EAF) by 2010. SA 
also signed the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
(CCFR) and the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (MCM, 2005a). 
The WSSD, CCFR and UNCLOS oblige fishing nations to integrate capacity management in 
their fisheries management systems (Pascoe et al., 2008). Realizing the above facts further 
developed the enthusiasm to base this study on overcapacity.  
 
1.3.2. The Extent of the Issue  
The majority of industrial fisheries in SA, including the hake and small pelagics’ fisheries are 
facing overcapacity. Overcapacity is not restricted to industrial fisheries in SA. Overcapacity (has 
also been observed in a traditional line fishery in SA. Cunningham & Gréboval (2001) state that 
overcapacity affects small-scale fisheries as much as it does large-scale fisheries. Madau (2009) 














revenues and labour intensive nature. In SA, overcapacity is a key challenge in controlling 
fishing effort and fisheries managers see overcapacity as ‘the devil making work for idle hands’, 
while economists see the capital invested capital as ‘rent seeking’ (Barkai & Bergh, 2007).   
Tingley et al. (2003) proclaims that overcapacity and overexploitation are inseparables. 
This is also emphasized by Barkai & Bergh (2007) who states that overcapacity is one of the root 
causes of overfishing in SA.  Claims of overfishing persisted in SA in 2007. This is noteworthy 
as overcapacity in the HDST fishery was also detected in 2007 (Barkai & Bergh, 2007).  
Looking at the Global Context 
Overcapacity is not confined to SA, it has rather been a nuisance in many fisheries globally, for 
example Chinese fisheries (Yu & Yu, 2008), five United States fisheries (Kirkley et al., 2002), 
eight South and Southeast Asian countries’ fisheries (Stobutzki et al., 2006), Norwegian trawl 
fisheries (Standal & Aarset, 2008) and Taiwanese coastal fisheries (Huang & Chuang, 2010)1. 
 
Initiatives  
The concern about overcapacity was globalised by FAO through several of its initiatives. In 
1995, FAO compiled CCFR. In 1997, FAO’s committee on fisheries formally raised the need to 
manage overcapacity. Consequently, FAO organized a working group for the management of 
fishing capacity to discuss issues associated with the description, measurement and management 
of fishing capacity. In 2009, this led to the development of an International Plan of Action for the 
management of fishing capacity (IPOA-capacity). IPOA-capacity encourages fishing nations to 
address overcapacity (Bayfiff, 2005)2. Further, in 1947, overcapacity was among the main topics 
in an overfishing conference in London. Nevertheless, the majority of nations began addressing 
overcapacity within the past few decades (Pascoe & Gréboval, 2003) and regardless of the strides 
taken to address overcapacity, the world’s fishing fleet remain increasing (Joseph ., Undated). 
 
Different Perspectives on the Concept of Overcapacity 
Generally, there are different perspectives with regard to overcapacity, depending on a fisher’s 
scale. In large-scale fisheries, overcapacity is usually a concern and the majority of such fisheries 
attempt to reduce it. In small-scale fisheries, overcapacity in terms of many vessels maintains the 
                                                          
1 For more examples, See Asche et al.,2008; Dupont et al., 2002; Fina, 2005; Guttesen, 1992; Holland et al .,1999; 
Ibarra et al.,2002; Johnsen, 2005;  Madau et al., 2009;  Maravelias & Tsitsika, 2008;  McCay  et al.,1996 
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labour intensive nature of these fisheries. Hence, the incentive to reduce overcapacity in small-
scale fisheries is weak and managers often have hard choices to make (Bayliff et al., 2005)3.   
 
1.4. Research Strategies, Aims and Questions  
This study is inductive and adductive in terms of research strategies (Blaikie, 2000) and aims to 
examine overcapacity in the HDST fishery through the following questions.  
1. What is overcapacity, how is it defined in technical, biological and economic terms? 
2. To what extent is there overcapacity in the HDST fishery? 
3. What are the main factors driving capacity to the current level in this fishery? 
4. What are the measures used to manage this capacity and what are their implications? 
 
1.5. Research Methods 
Research methods used for this study are quantitatively based on input measures of fishing 
capacity and qualitatively based on subjective measures of fishing capacity. The quantitative 
methods were mainly based on the secondary data from MCM’s database called Marine 
Administrative System (MAST). The qualitative methods were more primary in nature through 
interviews, using a questionnaire (See Appendix 1). A comprehensive literature review was 
undertaken to address the first and the last research questions.  
 
1.5.1. Input-based Assessment 
The input-based assessment was carried out to assess the fishing capacity development between 
1998 and 2009 and thus determine the extent of overcapacity in the HDST fishery. Data relating 
to the total number of vessels, length, gross tonnage and engine power for vessels operating in the 
HDST fishery and the hake TACs were extracted from MAST. The total number of people 
employed in the HDST fishery between 1998 and 2009 was calculated based on 
TAC/employment adjustment ratio4 for the HDST fishery. The data for the catch per unit effort, 
sea days and landings from 1998 to 2009 were obtained from MCM’s research directorate. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2See also Pascoe et al.,, 2008; Gréboval, 2004; FAO, 1999; Ward et al., 2004 
3 See also Béné et al., 2010; Metzner, 2004; Pascoe et al., 2004;  
4 This implies one full-time job for every nominal tonnes of the fishery’s products, i.e. if the HDST fishery’s share of 
TAC increases or decrease by 1000 tonnes, the industry respectively gain or lose 62  people.   
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1.5.2. Subjective Assessment  
This was carried out to investigate the causes and impacts of overcapacity including the 
implications of the capacity management measures in the HDST fishery (See Appendix 1).  The 
semi-structured, open ended interviews (Blaikie, 2000) were conducted on five representative of 
selected HDST fishing companies and one representative of the South African Deep Sea Trawl 
Industrial Association (SADSTIA) (See Appendix 2). Each of the interviewees was contacted 
prior to the interview to schedule the meeting and the questionnaire was sent prior to the meeting. 
During the meeting, both the interviewer and the interviewee would go through the questions and 
answers to straighten out uncertainties. Data capture was through notes and tape recordings.  
 
1.6. Limitations 
The field work for this study has been conducted in a short period of time. The following 
therefore has hindered an in-depth assessment of overcapacity in the HDST fishery. Firstly, the 
study focused only on fishing overcapacity, it could not assess processing overcapacity, yet 
fishing and fish processing industries are directly affected. Secondly, the secondary data used for 
the quantitative methods might not be as accurate as when collected through a primary study. 
Lack of data about the total crew for other vessels on MAST is another limitation of using a 
secondary data. Thirdly, the study used input-based fishing capacity measure since it is simpler, 
requiring less and easily accessible data. The input-based method is not as accurate as output 
based method and hence a less rigorous way of assessing capacity. Several studies, recommend 
the use of both input and output based methods. Lastly, only five fishing operation managers 
were interviewed and no fishery’s managers were interviewed. Statistically, this is a very small 
sample size which could bias the findings and thereby conclusions of the entire study.  
 
1.7. Key Findings 
Substantial fishing capacity was brought into the HDST fishery during the recent fishing rights 
allocation, leading to overcapacity. The utilization of that capacity is restricted through the TAC 
reduction and effort control regimes, leading to capacity under-utilization at fleet and individual 
vessel levels. This capacity under-utilization reduces employment and increases the operational 
costs in the HDST industry. However, it led to the recovery of the deep water hake coupled with 
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improved CPUE.  The management of the HDST fishery looks at overcapacity from the state’s 
perspective. It has thus moved overcapacity and the responsibility to deal with it to the industry.  
1.8. Relevance 
This study is considered relevant due to the following reasons. First, the HDST fishery is very 
capital intensive and overcapacity is one of the major challenges in its management. Second, the 
country recently broadened access in fisheries to address past imbalances. Reducing fishing 
capacity requires excluding fishers in addition to vessels. Therefore, this would affect the fishers 
who were denied of access in the past. Third, reducing effort is a difficult task in SA, as the state 
cannot compensate those excluded from fishing, due to limited funds. Fourth, this is the first 
study to deal with overcapacity in the South African hake fishery. It could therefore recommend 
measures to ameliorate the current fishing capacity management strategies in the HDST fishery. 
If published, it may bring information about overcapacity in the HDST fishery to the public. 
1.9. The Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the background of the HDST 
fishery. Chapter 3 presents different perspectives with regard to the concept of fishing capacity, 
defines overcapacity and discusses various fishing capacity assessment methods. Chapter 4 
presents the signals, extent, drivers and impacts of overcapacity in the HDST fishery. Chapter 5 
presents fishing capacity management measures for this fishery with their implications and 
measures taken by the industry to counter overcapacity. Chapter 6 discusses the findings. 







2: Background: The Hake Deep Sea Trawl Fishery, South Africa 
 
2.1. Introduction 
South Africa (SA) is located at the southern tip of the African Continent. The country is well 
endowed with marine resources with a 3000 km long coastline and a 200 nm long Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EZZ). The coastline is divided into South, West, East and Kwa-Zulu Natal 
(KZN) (See Fig. 2.1). The West Coast comprises of cold, nutrient- rich waters of the Benguela 
Current (See Fig. 2.3) and is among the most productive upwelling systems in the world. The 
East Coast is less productive but with higher species diversity. The KZN coast is typified by the 
Agulhas Current (See Fig. 2.3), that brings warm nutrient-deficient waters down the East Coast 








Fig. 2.1. South African coastline and EZZ (dotted line) (Adapted from Sowman, 2006: 62) 
 
The availability of fish is explained by the biogeographical differences of the coast. The most 
lucrative fish and industrial fisheries are concentrated on the West Coast. The recreational and 
subsistence fisheries are more prevalent on the South, East and KZN Coasts (Badenhorst, 1997).   
                                                          
5 See also Branch & Clark, 2006;Hutton et al., 1999; Payne & Crawford, 1989; Sumaila et al., 2002 
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2. 2.  South African Fishing Industry: An Overview  
The South African fishing industry comprises about 20 marine fisheries, ranging from small to 
large scale (See Appendix 3) (Branch et al., 2002)6. It has a value of about 4 billion South 
African Rands, translating to less than 1 % contribution to the gross domestic product. Hence, it 
is a relatively small sector in the economy of SA (Ponte & van Sitter, 2006). Since the recent 
issuing of fishing rights, there are major changes in the South African industry.  
 
2.3. The Hake Fishery: Brief Overview 
The South African hake fishery is partitioned into the Hake Deep Sea Trawl (HDST), Hake 
Inshore Trawl (HIST), Hake Long Line (HLL) and Hake Hand Line (HHL) sectors. It began in 
the 1890s, as a trawl fishery and was broken into HDST and HIST in the late 1970s. The HLL 
was introduced in 1994 with an unstructured HHL recently being recognized. In commercial 
terms, the hake fishery is the most important fishery in SA and in terms of quantity, it ranks 
second after small pelagics’ fishery (MCM, 2005)7.  
 
2.4. The Hake Deep Sea Trawl Fishery  
Since HDST fishery catches 84 % of the hake Total Allowable Catch (TAC), it dominates the 
hake fishery in terms of capital, landings and value (Fairweather, 2001)8.   
2.4.1. Biological Aspects  
The HDST fishery targets 90 % of the deep water Cape hake (Merluccius paradoxus) and only 10 
% of the shallow water Cape hake, (Merluccius capensis). These species are morphologically 




Fig. 2.2. The deep and shallow water Cape hakes (adapted from http://www.ij.co.za) 
                                                          
6 See also Branch & Clark, 2006; Clark et al., 2002; MCM, 2007; Sowman, 2006 
7 See also MCM, 2006-2007; Hutton et al., 1999, Ponte & van Sittert, 2006;Promoting Agribusiness Linkages      
  (PAL), Undated; Tingley et al., 2007 
           
               M. paradoxus, the mainstay of HDST fishery                     M. capensis, the mainstay of HIST fishery                            
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The shallow water hake inhabits the continental down to a depth of  380 m between East London 
and Port Nolloth (See Fig 2.3). The deep water hake is found between 150 m and 800 m water 
depths from Port Elizabeth to Port Nolloth (See Fig 2.3) 
 
 
                                       Cape hake’ distribution                                           
 
 
                       
 
                                          
                    HDST fishing operations 
 
Fig. 2.3. Cape hakes’ distribution and HDST operations (adapted from www.capfish.co.za) 
 
 
The general k-selected9 life history trait of hakes makes them prone to overexploitation. Cape 
hakes are omnivorous, feeding on zooplankton when juveniles and get more piscivourous as they 
grow older. In addition  to being dominant dominant predators in the demersal habitat, 
cannibalism and opportunistic feeding  are prominent within each species. Cape hakes are serial 
spawners and their year-round availability ensures consistent supply and continuity of the market. 
Kingklip, (Genypterus capensis), monk (Lophius upsicephalus), snoek (Thysites atun) and kob 
(Argyrosomus japonicus) form the by-catch of the HDST fishery (Hutton et al., 1999)10.  
2.4.2. Fishing Operations 
The HDST fishery operates in waters deeper than 300 m, in the Western Cape (93 %), i.e. Cape 
Town (67 %)  and out of Saldanha Bay (33 %) (See Fig. 2.3). Only 7 % of operations take place 
in Eastern Cape with 5 % in Port Elizabeth and 2 % out of Mossel Bay (Hutton et al., 1999)11.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
8 See also Hutton et al., 1999; Ponte & van Sittert, 2006; Punt & Butterworth, 1995; von der Heyden et al., 2006 
9  Slow growers with large body size and known to be reaching maturity late in their life span  
10 See also Hutton & Sumaila, 2002; Lombarte & Fortuno, 2005; Payne & Crawford, 1989; Powers et al., 2004;   
   Tingley et al., 2007; von der Hyden et al., 2006 
11 See also Hutton & Sumaila, 2002; Ponte & van  Sittert, 2006; Tingley et al., 2007 
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2.4.3. Fishing Right Holders 
Over the years, the development of the HDST fishery has shown an increase in the number of 
right holders (See Fig. 2.4). This was brought by improved accessibility to fishing rights for 
people who were deprived of access to the fishery in the past. This is reflected in the number of 
right holders who have increased from three in 1978 to seven in 1986. In 1992, following the 
publication of the Sea Fisheries Policy of 1985, 21 right holders operated in the HDST fishery. 
The Marine Living Resource Act of 1998 (MLRA) which replaced the Sea Fisheries Act acted as 









Fig. 2.4. HDST fishery’s Right Holders (1978-2009) (adapted from www.envirofishafrica.co.za) 
 
The number of right holders reached 55 in 1997 when the Medium Term fishing Rights (MTR) 
allocation took place. In 2006, the Long-Term fishing Rights (LTR) allocation was introduced 
and resulted in 89 right holders in the HDST fishery. This dropped to 45 right holders in 2009 as 
the newer and smaller entrants continued to sell their fishing rights (See Fig. 2.4). 
Since 1978, the established HDST fishery’s right holders organized themselves into the 
South African Deep-Sea Trawling Industry Association (SADSTIA). In 1996, smaller and newer 
entrants formed the Association of Small Hake Quota Industries (ASHQI) (MCM, 2004).  
 
Paper Quota Holders 
There are paper quota holders in the SA’s hake fishery since the fishing rights allocation era, as 
some of the newer and smaller entrants could not afford their own fishing equipments. Their 
quotas were too small to be profitable and hence proved to be non-viable. This forced them to 
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make joint ventures with established companies and foreign vessels, leading to a category termed 
‘paper quota holders’ in SA (MCM, 2004) 13.  
 
2.4.4. Fishing Technology 
The HDST fishery is capital intensive  and in 2009, 59 vessels operated in this fishery (See 
Appendix 4). These vessels are stern trawlers operating with a bottom trawl. The crew size is 
normally around 46 people for the freezer and 25 people for wet fish vessels. The wet fish vessels 
land about 50 tonnes of hake stored on ice in six days at sea and transport it to freezer facilities in 
more than 50 shore-based hake processing facilities. The freezer vessels process about 500 tonnes 
of hake in two months at sea (MCM, 2005)14.  
2.4.5. Catch Trends 
The development of the South African hake trawl fishery is demonstrated by an increase in 
catches over the years (Hutton et al., 1999)15. It began in 1890s, grew steadily after 1952 and 







Fig. 2.5. South African hake catches from 1950 to 2006 (Source: http://www.seaaroundus.org)  
 
Following the arrival of foreign trawlers after 1962, the hake catches decreased and increased 
sharply after 1965 until the late 1960s. They increased again in the early 1970s, declined after 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
12 See also Hutton et al., 1999; MCM, 2005;Ponte & van Sittert, 2006; Sumaila, 2005 
13 See also Fishing Industry Handbook, 2002 & 2007; Ponte & van Sittert, 2006; Powers et al., 2004; Sumaila, 2005; 
14 See also Hutton et al., 1999; Hutton ,2003; Ponte & van Sittert, 2006 
15 See also Payne & Crawford, 1989; Ponte & van Sittert, 2006 
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1975 and became relatively stable until the early 1980s, leading to the declaration of an EEZ in 
1977. They increased sharply between 1985 and 1990 and hovered around 600 000 tonnes until 
another sharp increase occurred between 2000 and 2005 (See Fig. 2.5).  
 
2.4.6. Product Characteristics 
The HDST fishery’s primary products include fresh and frozen products. Fresh products include 







Fig. 2.6.  HDST fishery’s primary products (Adapted from www.seaharvest.co.za )  
 
Fresh products account for two thirds of the HDST fishery’s catch. They are landed on ice and 
further processed onshore to a range of value-added products. Frozen products include fillets and 
head and gutted. They are partially processed at sea, mainly for exports (Hutton et al., 1999)16. 
 
2.4.7. Social Aspects 
The HDST fishery provided about 8.938 jobs in 2006 and the majority of which were onshore-






Fig. 2.7. HDST fishery employment by sector (Source: http://www.envirofishafrica.co.za) 
                                                          
16 See also Hutton 2003; Ponte & van Sittert, 2006 
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The ratio of onshore to sea employment is 3:1, for the HDST fishery This means for every person 
employed at sea, three people are employed onshore and vice versa (Powers et al., 2004).  
2.4.8. Economic Aspects 
The HDST fishery is the most valuable among South African fisheries and accounts for 50 % of 
the wealth generated from the country’s fisheries. The market value of the landed catch for this 
fishery is about 2 billion South African Rands annually. The value of assets is presumably more 
than 890 million South African Rands (Crosoer et al., 2006)17. 
 
Exports 
The HDST fishery exports account for 40 % of the total value of fish exports in SA. Cape hakes 
are mainly exported to Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, 










Fig. 2.8. Countries importing the South African hake (Source: www.seaharvest.co.za).  
 
European countries import about 80 % of Cape hakes with 38 % of which being imported by 
Spain alone (Ponte & van Sittert, 2006). 
2.4.9. Management 
The general fisheries system, revealing interactions among the fisheries governance, biophysical 
and socio-economic aspects of fisheries in SA, is illustrated below (See Fig. 2. 9).  
                                                          









Fig. 2.9. Fisheries system in the South African context (Source: Jayiya et al., 2008: 16).   
 
Goals and Institutions  
The governmental body that manages SA’s fisheries is called the Marine and Coastal 
Management (MCM). This is one of the branches of the Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (DEAT). It is guided by the Marine Living Resource Act of 1998 (MLRA) which 
mainly aims to achieve sustainable utilization of marine resources. Further, SADSTIA and 

















SA is a member of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN).  
The country signed the FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Management, UN’s 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 
addition UN, the following are international co-operations and agreements that affect the HDST 
fishery’s management and of which SA is a signatory to: Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species, Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the 
Marine and Coastal Environment of the East, West and Central African Regions African Region, 
Southern African Development Community Protocol on Fisheries, Agreement on Conservation 
of Albatrosses and Petrels, South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization and Montreal Protocol 
(MCM, 2008-2009). Further, during the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, SA 
committed itself to achieve an Ecosystem Approach in Fisheries Management (EAF) by 2010 
(MCM, 2005b). Currently, the country is making strides to implement EAF locally and across the 
region through the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem program (FAO, 2008), a trilateral 
project between South Africa, Namibia and Angola.   
 
Historical Background 
The HDST fishery’s management shows a dramatic development from an open access fishery 
with few local operating companies to a dual TAC/effort controlled fishery with many vertically 
integrated and non-viable operating companies including paper quota holders (See table 2.1). 
 














South Africans had lived under an apartheid18 regime for almost 40 years until 1994 when 
elections for a democratic president took place. Apartheid deprived blacks including coloureds  
an access to fishing. This resulted in a skewed distribution of fish resources between small-scale 
and large-scale fishers in addition to a totally uneven regional distribution of catching and 
processing possibilities. Due to this segregating type of regime, there existed what was then 
referred to as ‘white only’ beaches, driving a large number of coastal people to poverty. The 
fisheries administration was also dominated by whites. Hence, the hake fishery was at first 
concentrated among few white-owned companies. Since this regime, the fisheries managers have 
been facing a challenge to address these imbalances through transformation (MCM, 2002)19.  
 
Transformation 
Following the democratic elections, the ownership and management of fisheries in SA altered  
through transformation. The process can be described in three phases; (i) introduction of MLRA 
to broaden the fishing access of Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs)20; (ii) MTR 
allocation and (iii) LTR allocation. Internal transformation within established companies through 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was also achieved. The fishing quotas of empowered 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) were increased as part of transformation (MCM, 2002)21. 
 
Rights Allocation  
According to section 18 (1) of MLRA for anyone to be granted a fishing permit, a fishing right, 
should have been issued to them first. The commercial fishing right is considered as a resource 
management tool and a tool to drive economic development in SA. It is not a property right but a 





                                                          
18 Laws implemented and enforced by white governments between 1948 and 1990 in South Africa. 
19 See also Fishing Industry Handbook, 2000 & 2001;  Hersoug, 2002; MCM, 2004 
20 People who, prior to democratic dispensation were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of their  
    race and this includes juristic persons or associations owned and controlled by such persons  
21 See also MCM, 2004; Powers et al., 2004 
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Medium-Term Rights 
Medium-Term fishing Rights (MTR) refer to four year long fishing rights allocated to the South 
African fishers and fishing companies in 2001. Investment and experience in the fishing industry 




This refers to eight and fifteen year long term fishing rights which were allocated to South 
African fisheries 2006. The next round of LTR allocation in the HDST fishery will take place in 
2020. The allocation criteria is shown in Appendix 5. In contrast to the MTR allocation, the LTR 
process design was detailed and thorough and guided by a fisheries general including sectoral 
policies. This was more transparent as the stakeholders were consulted throughout the process. 
LTRs are perceived as one of the powerful tools to create jobs and boost economic upliftment in 
SA (Fishing Industry Handbook, 2004)23 
 
Input and Technical Management Controls 
MCM implements a range of input and technical management controls for the major South 
African fisheries including the HDST fishery (See Appendix 6).  
 
Output Management Controls 
The hake fishery’s output is controlled by a TAC that combines both Cape hakes. The TAC is 





Fig. 2.11. Hake TAC allocations per sector (Source: http://www.envirofishafrica.co.za) 
                                                          
22 See also Hersoug, 2002; Fishing Industry Handbook, 2003 & 2003; MCM, 2004 
23 See also Fishing Industry Handbook, 2006; Fishing Industry news, April 2006; Ponte & van Sittert, 2006 
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The HDST fishery gets 90 % of the deep water hake’s share of the TAC (See Appendix 7).  
The hake TAC is calculated based on Operational Management Procedures (OMPs)24 based on 
f0.075
25 reference point and the TAC is always set below estimated maximum sustainable yield.  
 
The hake TAC fluctuated between 105,000 tonnes (1983) and 140,000 tonnes (1987), hovered 
around 130,000 to 135,000 tonnes since the early 1990s, was It was set at 151,000 tonnes 
between 1995 to 1999, increased to 155,500 tonnes in 2000, increased further to 166,000 tonnes 
in 2002 and was reduced each year since 2003 due to  a decline in the biomass of the deep water 
hake biomass (See Fig. 2.15) (MCM, 2006-2007)26. 
 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance  
MCM’s Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) includes fishery control officers (FCOs), 
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and vessel patrols (See Appendix 8) (MCM, 2008-2009)27.  
 
2.4.11. Resource status  
The biomass for Cape hakes declined substantially in the previous years (See Fig 2.12). 








Fig. 2.12. The biomass of Cape hakes (Source: MCM, 2009: 6).  
                                                          
24This refers to developing robust management based on projections of management alternatives under uncertainties  
   in the stock assessment. During OMP, various management objectives, risks and constraints are agreed upon,   
   tested  in simulations involving projecting impacts of alternative assumptions about population dynamics  
   and reaction of management quantities to those alternatives and ultimately form the basis of management actions.   
25This refers to the fishing effort where the slope of the yield per recruit curve is 7.5 % of the slope at the origin.    
    During OMPs’ formulation this effort level was a compromise between strategies that provided higher  
    probabilities of quick recovery but higher chances of TAC decline and vice versa.  
26See also MCM, 2008 & 2009; Sumaila, 2005; Plaganyi et al., 2007; Ponte & van  Sittert, 2006;  
    Powers et al., 2004; Tingley et al., 2007 







































The South African hake fishery obtained the Marine Stewardship Certification in 2004, as a 
responsible fishery. In accordance with International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) biological reference points, M. capensis is harvested sustainably (MCM, 2006-2007)28. 
M. paradoxus is overexploited but its recovery signs have recently been reported (See Fig. 2.13). 
 
                                    







                                                                                         Spawning  
                                                M. paradoxus                                    Stock Biomass  
  Limit SSB    (SSB) 
      (Blim)                                                                            M. paradoxux          
              
 Fishing mortality (F) 
Fig. 2.13. ICES reference points with Cape hakes’state (adapted from Nielsen, 2008: 9). Species 
in a green colour is safe; in yellow, precautions should be taken and in red, is overexploited. 
 
2.4.12. Stock Recovery Plan 
In order to recover the deep water hake stock, the fishing effort applied in the HDST fishery has 








Fig. 2.14.  Predicted future effort required for HDST fishery (Source: MCM, 2009: 9). The 
shaded areas show probability envelopes at the 50th (darkest), 75th and 95th (lightest) percentiles. 
                                                          
















The figure below (Fig. 2. 15) demonstrate the predicted spawning biomass of the hake deep water 
hake and the CPUE of the HDST fishery including the changes in TAC that would be achieved in 













Fig. 2.15. Future trajectory predicted for M. paradoxus SSB, HDST fishery’s CPUE, hake TAC 
and change in the TAC (Source: MCM, 2009: 7).  
2.5. Summary 
The HDST fishery is the most capital intensive fishery in SA. It has shown a dramatic 
development from being dominated by a few established companies to an extremely capital 
intensive industrial fishery with largely vertically integrated companies including small-scale 
non-viable fishing operators and paper quota holders. The management evolved from an open 
access fishery to a restricted access, dual TAC / effort controlled fishery. Since the mainstay of 
this fishery (M.paradoxus) has shown signals of overexploitation, the hake TAC is reduced each 
year to facilitate the recovery of this species. Further, the fishing effort has to be reduced 




3. Theoretical Foundation: Fishing Capacity 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Following the globalization of overcapacity as a concern in fisheries, fishing capacity definition 
and assessment methods became of importance in the world of fisheries management. This has 
led to the development of a range of fishing capacity definitions and assessment methods. In 
essence, to design effective management measures of overcapacity, it is essential to explicitly 
understand the fishing capacity definitions and assessment methods.      
3.2. Defining Fishing Capacity 
The concept of fishing capacity and related concepts are not as clearly understood as other 
concepts in fisheries (Bayliff, 2005)29. The reasons for that are threefold. Firstly, stakeholders 
involved in fisheries have different notions pertaining to the concept of fishing capacity (Pascoe 
et al., 2008). Secondly, excess capacity, latent capacity, overcapacity, and overcapitalization are 
often perceived as synonyms since they are loosely different (Bayliff, 2005)30. Thirdly, fisheries 
multiple outputs, fluctuating prices and the unpredictable nature of fisheries resources make it 
tricky to practically define the concept of fishing capacity (Hatcher, 2004). Nevertheless, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations’ definition of fishing capacity 
which is adopted worldwide and in South Africa (SA) states that: 
 
‘‘Fishing capacity is the maximum amount of fish over a period of time (year, season) 
that can be produced by a fishing fleet if fully utilized, given the biomass and age 
structure of the fish stock and the present state of the technology’’ (FAO, 2000: 6). 
 
 In this context, full utilization implies unrestricted fishing. In simple terms, fishing capacity is 
the ability of a fleet to catch fish (FAO, 2000)31. As mentioned above, the perception of what 
constitutes fishing capacity differs among stakeholders involved in fisheries.  
 
 
                                                          
29 See also Gréboval & Munro, 1999; Joseph et al., 2006; Kirkley et al., 2004;  Lindebo, 2004; Metzner, 2005; Reid 
et al., 2003; Standal, 2009; Ward et al., 2004 
30See also  Metzner, 2005; Pascoe et al., 2004; Pascoe et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2007;  
31 See also Gréboval & Munro, 1999; Moreno & Majkowski, 2006   
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3.2.1. Fisheries Technologists’ Perspective 
Fisheries technologists associate fishing capacity with the technological and practical feasibility 
of a vessel to achieve a particular level of activity in terms of fishing days and fishing output. 
Therefore, they define fishing capacity as the amount of catch that the vessel could produce for 











Fig. 3.1. Technological definition of fishing capacity (Source: Kirkley & Squires, 1999: 83) 
 
In previous years, fisheries technologists tended to favor the term ‘fishing power’ over that of 
‘fishing capacity’.  However, these concepts are different and therefore fishing power could give 
a misleading impression of the exact fishing capacity. Further, a problem that would arise in such 
situations is that, once the fishing power gets controlled, the fishers would always find other 
ways to increase their capacity to fish (Bayliff, 2005)32.  
3.2.2. Fisheries Biologists’ Perspective 
Fisheries biologists associate fishing capacity with the fishing effort33 and the consequential 
mortality. In this regard, when the fishing mortality goes beyond the limit reference point which 
is usually set at  the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) (See Figs. 3.2 & 3.3), the mortality rate 
is considered too high,  due to too much effort applied (Joseph et al., 2006)34. This implies, the 
biologists assume a positive relationship between fishing effort and the fishing mortality.  
                                                          
32 See also Kirkley & Squires, 1999; Walden & Kirkley, 2004; Ward et al., Undated 
33 Theoretically, fishing effort includes all fishing inputs but since it is practically impossible measure all of them, 
fishing time and number of gears are used as surrogate measures.. 











Fig. 3.2. Fishing mortality at MSY (FMSY) (Source: Caddy & Mahon, 1995: 20).    
 
3.2.3. Fisheries Economists’ Perspective 
Economists relate capacity to the potential catch that a vessel or fleet could attain when operating 
at maximum profits, i.e., at Maximum Economic Yield (MSY) (See Fig. 3.3) In this context, 








Fig. 3.3. Gordon-Schaefer model, showing: MEY, MSY and open access reference points with 
their efforts: E1 (EMEY), E2 (EMSY) and E3 (E∞) respectively (Source: Caddy & Mahon, 1995: 19). 
 
3.2.4. Fisheries Managers’ Perspective 
Fisheries managers relate fishing capacity to the size and the gross tonnage of a fleet. In a fishery 
that is managed by a Total Allowable Catch (TAC), fishing capacity in this perspective refers to 
                                                          
35 See also Joseph et al., 2006; Kirkley & Squires, 2004; Lindebo, 2004; Metzner, 2005; Pascoe et al., 2008; 
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the fleet size that is necessary to catch TAC. This implies that a larger fleet may potentially fish 
beyond the TAC allocated to it (Hatcher, 2004)36. 
 
Each of the above definitions is associated with a specific fishing capacity level. To 
technologists, the fully utilized fishing fleet implies optimal fishing capacity. To managers, a 
fleet size necessary to attain a given TAC implies optimal fishing capacity. To biologists, the 
optimal fishing capacity is applied at MSY and to economists it is applied at MEY. The degree of 








Fig. 3.4. Rough indicators of overcapacity based on the above perspectives. Fcurrent implies the 
current capacity with FMSY and FMEY implying the capacity at MSY and MEY respectively 
 
In economic terms, overcapacity occurs when a fishery fishes beyond MEY. From the biologists’ 
perspective, overcapacity occurs when the fishery fishes beyond MSY. To managers, if TAC 
could be exceeded, then overcapacity exist in a fishery. However, in a technologists’ perspective, 
overcapacity exists when the fleet is under-utilized (See Fig. 3.4).  
3.3. Defining Overcapacity and Related Concepts 
The concepts of latent capacity, excess capacity, overcapacity and overcapitalization are used as 
synonyms in fisheries, yet they are not similar but closely related (Metzner, 2005)37.   
                                                                                                                                                                                            
    Reid & Squires, 2006; Walden, 2000;  Ward, Undated 
36 See also Lindebo, 2004; Metzner, 2005; Pascoe et al., 2008; Walden & Kirkley, 2000; Ward et al., 2004 
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3.3.1. Latent Capacity 
This refers to the trend of capacity that has either never been used or been used previously but 
currently inactive in the fishery. It is caused by capacity under-utilization (Madau et al., 2009)38.  
3.3.2. Excess Capacity  
Excess capacity is a short-term phenomenon implying that a vessel or fleet can produce more 
than it is currently producing. It could be caused by short-term market constraints, i.e., decreased 
fish prices or temporal management adjustment, for instance to allow stock recovery and when 
the fishery conditions get back to normal the excess capacity get back to work (Bayliff, 2005)39. 
3.3.3. Overcapacity 
Overcapacity refers to long-term excessive fishing capacity levels relating to a long-term target 
fishing capacity. The excessive capacity may be demonstrated by too many boats (Gréboval, 
2004) or powerful and bigger boats (Utne, 2008). The target capacity may correspond to either a 
target catch or target fleet size (Metzner, 2005)40 and depends on the goals of the fishery (Béne et 
al., 2010)41. If the goal is to maximize employment, indicators of overcapacity may be the 
consequence. Therefore, overcapacity would not be considered an issue. However, when 
overcapacity indicators are incompatible with the entire set of objectives in a given fishery, 
overcapacity is considered an issue, that needs to be addressed (Metzner, 2005).  
Overcapacities sometimes occur together with excess capacity in a fishery (See Fig. 3.5).  
In Fig 3.5, a fishery is operates on a long-run yield curve but sometimes operates on the short run 
curve with V (number of vessels), C1 (fish quantity). Vu (fully utilized vessels), V (total 
vessels).Excess capacity exists as C1 could also be caught by Vu.  If the managers aim to achieve 
CMSY, the fleet size would need to be reduced to VM (i.e., V at MSY). Differences V-VM and V-
Vu represent overcapacity and excess capacity respectively.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
37 See also Pascoe et al., 2004; Pascoe et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2007 
38 See also Kirkley & Squires, 2004; Ward et al., 2004 
39 See also National Marine Fisheries  Service , 2004; Pascoe et al., 2008; Sabatella & Piccinetti, 2004 
40 See also Gréboval, 2004; Metzner, 2005; Pascoe et al., 2004; Sabatella & Piccinetti, 2004 









Fig 3.5. An example of overcapacity and excess capacity (Source: Pascoe et al., 2008:12).  
 
Overcapacity may also occur without excess capacity. For example, in a fully utilized fleet with 
stock biomass (instead of effort) causing the lower catches, excess capacity would not be 
apparent even though the fishery would be overcapitalized with overcapacity (Metzner, 2005).  
 
Causes and Impacts 
Overcapacity usually stems from ill-defined property rights (Metzner, 2005), barriers to exit the 
fishery (Sumaila et al., 2007), race to fish, subsidies (Porter, Undated), market expansions and 
technological innovations (Pascoe & Gréboval, 2004)42. It  typically leads to overinvestment in 
capital (Utne, 2006), excessive employment of labour, redundant fishing inputs (Gréboval, 2004), 
overfishing (Bayliff, 2005)43, potential habitat degradation, rent44 dissipation (Gréboval, & 
Munro, 1999)45, reduced returns of capital and labour, resulting in poor quality of fishers 
livelihoods including political strife in the entire fishery’s management (Gréboval, 2004)46.  
 
Overcapacity is common in pure and regulated open access47 fisheries. In both cases, 
every fisher competes with every other fisher to catch as much as possible in the shortest time 
leading to ‘race for fish48 in addition to capital stuffing49  In open access fisheries in particular, 
                                                          
42 See also Gréboval & Munro, 1999; Ibarra et al., 2000; ; Ward et al., 2004; Weber, 1994 
43 See also FAO, 1999; Joseph et al., Undated; Metzner, 2005; Morgan, 2007; Pascoe et al., 2004 
44 This refers to abnormal profits, i.e., profits greater than normal and the highest rent is found when the maximum 
economic yield is attained in a given fishery 
45 See also Homas & Wilen; 1997 cited in Gréboval & Munro, 1999; Vestergaard & Frost, 1994 
46 See also Clark et al., 2005; Metzner, 2005; Sinclair et al., 2002; Sumaila et al., 2007; Ward, 2004 
47 In a regulated-open access fishery only the total harvest is controlled through the global TAC that is undivided 
48 A widely-known phenomena where by fisher rush to fish in competition for bigger catches & the profits are  
     usually spent on building up more overcapacity related to what is needed in order to catch the fish 
49 This occurs when fishermen attempt to increase their catches by using more unrestricted inputs in place of the     
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what makes sense for individuals makes no sense in the aggregate, resulting in too many vessels, 
too much gear, too much waste, and too little income for fishers (Gréboval & Munro, 1999)50.    
3.3.4. Overcapitalization 
Overcapitalization is the long-term issue which occurs when the fleet size exceeds what is 
required to harvest a given catch (See Fig 3.6).. It may be indicated by excess capacity.  For 
example, if the catch or effort is restricted and the restrictions are likely to persist in future, 
excess capital indicates overcapitalization and thus overcapacity in the fishery (Bayliff, 2005)51. 
 








Fig. 3.6. Overcapitalization indicated by excess capital. F (current fleet), produces O (output). 
FMSY (smaller fleet) can produce OMSY (maximum yield). (Source: Pascoe, 2004: 64).    
 
3.3.5. Capacity Utilization  
Capacity Utilization (CU) refers to the extent to which the vessel is utilized. Hence, from a  
fishery’s input perspective, CU refers to the ratio of the actual number of sea days the vessel or 
fleet fishes to the number of sea days it could potentially fish when unrestricted. Likewise, from a 
fishery’s output perspective, CU refers to the ratio of actual output to potential output (Greboval 
& Munro, 1999)52. CU values range between zero and one with one indicating that the current 
CU equals to the potential CU. Hence, when the CU value is less than one, a vessel or fleet is 
under-utilized and vice versa (Kirkley & Squires, 2004).  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
     restricted inputs usually vessel size in terms of tonnage and engine power.  
     50 See also Jensen 2002; Pascoe & Gréboval, 2003; Ward et al., 2004 
51 See also Pascoe, 2004; Pascoe et al., 2004; Metzner, 2005 
52 See also Gréboval, 2004; Kirkley & Squires, 1999; Kirkley & Squires, 2004; Pascoe, 2004; Pascoe et al., 2004; 
Reid & Squires, 2004; Sabatella & Piccinetti, 2004; Ward et al., 2004 
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Capacity under-utilization does not indicate technical inefficiency but they are related (See Fig. 






Fig. 3.7. An example of capacity under-utilization and technical inefficiency. Respectively, Vo 
and Vc (vessels), produce (Oo plus Oe) and Oc (Source: Pascoe et al., 2008: 
 
In Fig. 3.7, a vessel currently operates with Vo to produce Oo . It would have been fully utilized if 
it had been operating at Vc to produce Oc, provided the vessel is operating at full efficiency. 
However, if the vessel operates efficiently it would produce Oe at Vo. The differences Oc-Oe and 
Oe-Oo are due to capacity under-utilization and technical inefficiency respectively.  
3.4. Measuring Fishing Capacity 
The International Plan of Action for the management of fishing capacity (IPOA-capacity) calls 
for states to regularly asses and monitor fishing capacity, so as to avoid overcapacity. Hence, 
fishing capacity assessment has recently become a priority for a number of nations. Accordingly, 















The above methods are either input or output based. In essence, capacity can be simple measured 
through the size, attributes and utilization of the fleet (Pascoe & Gréboval, 2003).  
3.4.1. Input-based Measures  
Input-based fishing capacity measures, often referred to as traditional methods, are quantitative 
but straight forward methods as vessel attributes form fishing capacity measures directly. A total 
capacity of a fleet is measured by aggregating the capacity of vessels, e.g. total gross tonnage, 
engine power including vessel numbers and classes (Pascoe, 2004)53. Under this approach, the 
fleet capacity is assumed to be a function of fishing inputs if they are fully utilized in terms of 
fishing time. Furthermore, the output of the fishery is presumed to be related to inputs applied 
(Pascoe, 2004)54. Gréboval (1999)55 lists the fleet size; vessel’s length and age, engine power, 
tonnage, skipper’s skill and fishing time as constituents of input-based measures.  
3.4.2. Output-based Measures 
This approach has recently been developed and it refers to quantitative formal methods that 
measures capacity through potential output or CU of individual vessels. It thus implies that there 
is a connection between the inputs, their utilization and the output of the fishery (Pascoe, 2004)56.  
 
 Data Envelop Analysis 







Fig. 3.9. DEA, A is an observed output, A+B is potential output (Source: Reid et al., 2003: 454). 
                                                          
53 See also Pascoe et al., 2004; Sabatella & Piccinetti, 2004 
54 See also Kirkley & Squires, 1999; Pascoe et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2004 
55 See also kirkley & Squires, 1999; Pascoe & Gréboval , 2003; Ward et al., 2004 
56 See also Lindebo, 2004; Pascoe, 2004; Pascoe, 2004b; Pascoe et al., 2004; Ward, Undated 
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The best vessels, which have highest outputs, are assumed to be fully utilized, thus lie on the 
production frontier with under-utilized vessels lying below (See Fig. 3.9) (Gambino, 2004)57.   
 
Peak to Peak Method 
The Peak to Peak method (PTP) is the simplest formal output-based fishing capacity measure. It 
estimates catch per unit effort (CPUE) and assumes that peak output levels indicate full CU (See 








Fig. 3.10. An example of a PTP method (Source: Pascoe et al., 2003: 81) 
 
PTP also assumes that changes in peak CPUE are due to technological changes. In this regard, 
CU is determined through capacity output which is obtained by multiplying capacity rate by fleet 
size. The capacity rate is derived through the rate of technical change (Pascoe et al., 2003).  
 
Stochastic Production Frontier  
The Stochastic Production Frontier (SPF) is the most complicated among output-based measures 
of capacity, in particular for multiple outputs fisheries. This method estimates the maximum 
potential fishing output associated with the best practical use of the inputs (See Fig. 3.11). 
Therefore, it assumes that the output is a function of inputs and their efficiency. Despite it being 
                                                          
57 See also Joseph et al., 2006; Squires, 1999; Lindebo, 2004; Mardle & Tingley, 2004; National Marine Fisheries    
    Service , 2004; Pascoe et al., 2004; Ward, Undated 
58 See also Lindebo, 2004; Kirkley & Squires, 2004; National Marine Fisheries Service , 2004; Pascoe, 2004; Pascoe,  
    2004 (b); Pascoe et al., 2004; Ward, Undated 
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complicated, it does however, allow for the estimation of standard errors and confidence limits. 








Fig. 3.11. An example of SPF and PTT methods (Source Pascoe et al., 2003: 95) 
 
3.4.3 Subjective Methods 
Subjective method is based on the information from fishery’s experts, such as scientists and 
fishers. Based on their experience these experts may provide a picture as to how a fishery 
including the fleet looked like and changed in the preceding years. The fishers may also provide 
information about the current and previous CPUE including CU. Subjective assessment is carried 
out either through discussions or surveys. It is normally used when data are lacking. Since the 
information obtained may be biased, it should be used with caution (Pascoe et al., 2003)60.  
3.5. Indicators of Overcapacity 
The biological status of a fishery, the harvest/target ratio, the TAC versus the length of the 
season, conflict among fishers and managers, CPUE  and value per unit effort could indicate if 
overcapacity exist or not in the fishery (See Appendix 10) (Pascoe et al., 2008)61. 
3.6. Summary 
Each of the above methods has got specific advantages and downsides, and none is perfect. Each 
method is fishery specific, therefore there is no ‘one size fits all’- approach. It is good to use 
                                                          
59 See also Pascoe et al., 2004;  Kirkley & Squares, 1999; National Marine Fisheries Service , 2004; Ward, Undated 
60 See also Pascoe, 2004;  Pacoes et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2004 
61 See also Lindebo, 2004; Ward et al., 2004; Ward, Undated 
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various approaches as fishing capacity notion varies considerably among the stakeholders 
involved in fisheries. The input-based measures, however, have been utilized by the majority of 
nations, including South Africa, for years. The complex output-based methods have recently been 
developed. Input-based measures are the simplest and require lesser and easily accessible data. 
However, they are not as accurate as output-based methods and thus a less rigorous way of 
measuring capacity. Even so, this study adopted the fisheries technologists’ perspective on 
fishing capacity and is hence based on an input-based capacity measure. This is not by choice but 
because of lack of data and inadequate time for field work. Further, the fact that the fishing 
capacity for the South African hake fishery is estimated through input-based capacity measures 
has facilitated the availability of HDST fishery’s input data for this study. The data required for 














4. Extent, Drivers and Impacts of Overcapacity in the HDST Fishery  
 
4.1. Introduction 
The considerable amounts of fishing capacity that makes the HDST fishery as extremely capital 
intensive as it is today came with the recent allocation of fishing rights. Its utilization is presently 
restricted, indirectly through TAC reductions and directly through effort control regime.  
 
4.2 The Development of the HDST Fishery’s Fleet 
 
4.2.1. The Number of Vessels 
A substantial fleet capacity was built by the South African established fishing companies in 
preparation for Medium-Term fishing Rights (MTR) and Long-Term fishing Rights (LTR) 
allocation. Hence, the number of vessels in the HDST fishery increased up to 94 prior to MTR 
allocation in 2000 (See Fig 4.1).  Astoundingly, in 2003, only 59 vessels operated in this fishery. 










Fig. 4.1. Number of vessels and right holders operating in the HDST fishery (1998-2009).  
 
In addition to Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) who merged with the local 
established companies and with Spanish vessels which occupy about 30 % of the HDST fishing 
capacity, some HDIs came into the HDST fishery with their own fishing capacity. In spite of this, 
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the number of vessels in the HDST fishery have been decreasing since 2006 and the trend 
corresponds to the number of right holders (see Fig. 4.1).  
4.2.2. The Length, Gross Tonnage and Engine Power  
Subsequent to the declaration of an exclusive economic zone, the majority of big vessels which 
were from other countries were excluded from South Africa. Hence, few big vessels were 
brought into the HDST fishery during rights allocation. Further, the length and the Gross 
Registered Tonnage (GRT) of the HDST fishery’s vessels seem stable since 2003 (See Fig. 4.2). 
The engine power’s trend  slightly increases since 1999. The correlation reflected from Fig. 4.2 is 









Fig. 4.2: Average length, tonnage and power of the HDST fishery’s vessels (1998-2009).  
 
The maximum length of the HDST fishery’s vessels hovered around 84 m between 1998 and 








Fig. 4.3. Maximum and the most frequent vessel’s length in the HDST fishery (1998 -2009). 
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The vessels with 72 m in length have a GRT of 1745 tonnes and an engine power of 3000 HP. The 
HDST fleet is occupied with the majority of vessels that is 56 m in length (see Fig. 4.3), 
corresponding to 812 tonnes of GRT and an engine power of 1800 HP. 
 
4.3. Signals and Extent of Overcapacity 
In the HDST fishery, overcapacity is indicated by capacity under-utilization at both fleet and 
individual vessel’s levels (See Fig 4.4). The fleet’s under-utilization is indicated by latent capacity. 
The vessel’s under-utilization is seen through vessels that fish for short periods in a given season.   
 
  
   
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Indicators of overcapacity’s indicators in the HDST fishery 
 
Overexploitation of the deep water hake in 2005 and poor catch per unit effort (CPUE) since that year also 
indicated the existence of overcapacity in this fishery (See Appendix 3). The recent stock recovery 
and improved CPUE has not hitherto corrected capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery. 
4.3.1. Capacity Under-utilization 
The latent capacity mentioned above results form a decreasing trend in the number of operating 






















 Latent Capacity 
The latent capacity in the HDST fishery increases with the downward trend of the actual number of 










Fig. 4.6. Latent capacity and the capacity that is actually operating in HDST fishery (2005-2009) 
 
The examples of latent capacity in the HDST fishery are as follows. Irvin and Johnson fishing 
company (I&J) used nine vessels in 2009, twelve vessels in 2008 and twenty vessels in 2005. In 
2009, there were eleven latent vessels at I&J. Sea Harvest fishing company used fourteen vessels 
in 2009 and eighteen vessels in 2008. In 2009, there were four latent vessels at Sea Harvest.  
 
Under-utilization of Individual Vessels 
In the HDST fishery, under-utilization of vessels implies fishing for less than 265 days in a given 
fishing season (See Table 4.1 & Fig 4.7).  
 
Table 4. 1. Selected under-utilized vessels in the HDST fishery (2008-2009). 
    Sea days 
Name Length (m) GRT (tones) Power (HP) 2008 2009 
Echalar 72 1745 3000 179 106 
Flame Thorn 37 803 2059 265 222 
 Khulisa Eyethu 67 1582 2689 225 180 
 
The number of sea days for the vessels shown in Table 3.1 and Fig. 4.7 declined from 2008 to 












Fig. 4.7.  Selected under-utilized vessels in the HDST fishery (2008-2009).  
 
To appropriately quantify vessel’s under-utilization, the under-utilization of each vessel operating 
in the HDST fishery should be measured and that requires substantial time, of which this study did 
not have. Hence, for the purpose of this study, vessel’s under-utilization could only be measured 
for two years on selected vessels.   
 
4.4. Drivers of Overcapacity  
The key driver of overcapacity in HDST fishery is the management of the fishery itself (See Fig 
4.8).  However, technological creep and market constraints may also have an effect on the capacity 



































The figure below (Fig. 4.9) illustrates how overcapacity developed in the HDST fishery due to the 
management to its management. The capacity brought during MTR allocation led to 
overexploitation of the deep water hake. This in turn, induced the adoption of a TAC reduction 
strategy. Subsequently, the capacity available became more than required, leading to capacity 







Fig. 4.9. HDST fishery’s management (big rectangles) with overcapacity signals (small rectangles) 
 
Fishing Rights Allocation 
 A considerable capacity accumulated in the HDST fishery after LTR allocation due to the 
following reasons: (i) job creation and capital investment accounted for 50 % of the LTR 
allocation criteria; (ii) building small viable business was among the LTR allocation criteria and 
(iii) some of the HDIs brought new capacity and some merged with Spanish vessels. All this 
increased the HDST fishery’s fleet and made the HDST fishery even more capital intensive. In 
essence, the state could not dictate how much capacity investments should be made for rights 
allocation but can influence how that capacity is utilized, as they are doing now.   
 
TAC Reduction Regime 
The TAC reduction regime indirectly limits capacity utilization, leading to capacity under-
utilization (See Fig. 4.10). In essence, as the hake TAC is continuously reduced, the HDST 
fishery’s fleet size continuously get more than necessary for its share of the TAC. As a result, the 








Fig. 4. 10. Average number of vessels, their engine power and hake TAC (1998-2009)  
 
The prioritization of vessels and clustering leads to a preference of more powerful and newer 
vessels over the small, old and less powerful vessels. This is explained by the observed increase in 
the engine power while the fleet size declines.  Presumably, the less powerful vessels dominate the 
latent capacity in this fishery.   
 
Effort Control Regime 
The effort regime matches the engine power of each active vessel with the quota it intends to catch 
in a given fishing season and allocates sea days to each vessel accordingly. This leads to capacity 
under-utilization of vessels with excessive power. Further, this regime also contributes to latent 
capacity through vessel clustering and prioritization.  
 
4.4.2. Technological Creep 
The HDST fishery’s right holders consider HDST fishery as always been fairly abreast in 
technological terms, as they always used the state of art fish finding equipments.  However, some 
right holders state that the capacity required to deliver the daily catch in 2009 was lesser than the 
capacity required in 2005. This study attributes this to technological creep62, a fact that seems 
overlooked by the HDST fishery’s right holders. These right holders believe that the recently 
proclaimed deep water hake stock recovery coupled with improved CPUE is what decreased the 
capacity utilization in 2009. This could also be true as when the stock size is in bad shape, more 
fishing effort is typically required. 
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4.4.3. Market Constraints 
Market-induced capacity under-utilization must have occurred in 2009 in the HDST fishery due to 
the following reasons. First, hake demand was both internationally and nationally low, attributing 
to the global economic crisis. The global economic crisis resulted in poor exchange rates as the 
South African Rand became relatively strong.  Second, Cape hakes compete with cheaper 
Vietnamese Pangassius in the European markets. Further, the unstable fuel price (See Fig. 4.11) 








Fig. 4. 11. South African fuel prices from 2007 to 2009 (Source: www.shell.co.za) 
 
4.5. Impacts of Overcapacity  
The ongoing capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery has resulted to a number of 
biological, economical and social impacts (See Fig. 4.12).  
 
Fig. 4.12. The impacts of capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
62 This refers to the tendency for the fishing technology to become more efficient over time  due to technological 
progress. Technological progress does not stop and just like any other equipment, vessels and fishing gears are 
continually upgraded and improved (Barkai & Berg, 2007).  
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These impacts are positive for the biological part of the HDST fishery. In a social and economic 
perspective, they are negative. Further, in a socio-economic perspective they contradict the main 
objective of the Marine Living Resource Act of 1998 to promote sustainable utilization of marine 
resources. Sustainability is not only about environment (fish in this case) but people and the 
economy associated with it form part of it. 
4.5.1. Biological Impacts  
The ongoing capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery has led the recovery of the deep 
water hake stock coupled with an improved CPUE.  
 
4.5.2. Economic Impacts 
Since hake quotas are small, fishing vessels spend many days at sea catching few fish, thus 
increasing the operational costs.  Further, the latent capacity and under-utilized vessels need to be 
maintained. In essence, when costs are high, the profits automatically decrease in any fishery. 
Some vessels are operating below normal profits in the HDST fishery and a number of HDIs 
continuously leave the fishery due to inefficient profits brought by their non-viable quotas.  
Investments on capital have been stopped in HDST fishery as the fishing companies are currently 
stuck with the capital they invested on prior to the recent fishing rights allocation.  
 
4.5.3. Social Impacts 
The number of the HDST fishery’s employees decreases due to capacity under-utilization (Fig 








Fig. 4.13. Number of employees in the HDST fishery and the hake TAC (1998-2009).  
42 
4.6. Summary 
The recent allocation of fishing rights increased the fishing capacity in the HDST fishery leading 
to overcapacity. The utilization of this capacity is restricted through the TAC reduction and effort 
control regimes leading to capacity under-utilization. Hence, overcapacity in the HDST fishery 
does not stem from the constant fishing capacity increase, as the last time capital investments 
were made in this fishery was prior to the MTR allocation. The fishing capacity in this fishery 
automatically increases due to the ongoing restrictions in capacity utilization. In an economic 
point of view, this capacity under-utilization inflicts direct costs to the entire HDST industry 
through forgone economic profits. In a social perspective, it reduces employment levels in 
addition to low income for other employees.  However, biologically, this capacity under-
utilization has resulted to the recovery of the deep water hake and improved the CPUE.  Hence, 
the fishing capacity management in the HDST fishery works in favour of the state. It reduced 
overcapacity in the biological part of the fishery but led to substantial overcapacity in economic 














5. The Hake Deep Sea Trawl Fishing Capacity Management 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Referring to measures that match the fleet’s fishing potential with the desired fishing output, 
fishing capacity management recently became a concern in fisheries. The increasing occurrence 
of overcapacity in world fisheries drove the United Nation (UN)’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) to formally raise the need for fishing capacity management through several 
of its initiatives. The FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCFR) introduced in 
1995 urges states to manage fishing capacity. In 1997, FAO created a fishing capacity working 
group. Consequently, capacity management became a theme in several international conferences 
leading to formulation of the FAO’s International Plan of Action for Fishing Capacity 
Management (IOPA-capacity) in 1999. IPOA-capacity urges states to base formulation and 
implementation of fishing capacity management measures on the CCFR. It further urges states to 
often assess, monitor and manage their fishing capacity, giving priority to fisheries facing 
overcapacity. It also urges states to strengthen their regional fisheries organizations and comply 
with international agreements, such as UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
addition to the CCFR so as to improve their fishing capacity management (Bayliff, 2005)63 
 
5.2. Management Measures 









Fig. 5.1. The management measures affecting HDST fishing capacity 
                                                          
63 See also FAO, 1999; Gréboval, 2004; Pascoe & Gréboval 2003; Pascoe, 2004; Pascoe et al.,  2004; Pascoe et al., 
2008;  Ward et al., 2004 
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There is no commercial fishing allowed to take place in South Africa (SA) without the fishing 
right. Once a person becomes a fishing right holder, a yearly fishing permit is required for that 
person to carry out the fishing activity. The vessel to be used for the fishing activity has to be 
licensed and in the HDST fishery in particular, sea days are allocated to that vessel based on the 
amount of its engine power and the quota it intends to catch in a given fishing season.  
5.2.1. Effort Control Model 
The effort control model for the HDST fishery was proposed by the South African Deep Sea 
Trawl Industrial Association (SADSTIA) and is now controlled by Marine and Coastal 
Management (MCM). Regarded as essential for the recovery of the deep water hake, this regime 
matches vessel’s capacity to quota allocations in order to reduce the fishing capacity of the 
HDST fishery (DEAT, 2007a)64.   
 
 Background 
SA’s fisheries managers recognize the need to incorporate both input and output controls in 
fisheries management, as pure input controls lead to effort creep and pure output controls lead to 
high grading. In 2006, MCM enlisted SADSTIA to suggest an effort control for the hake fishery 
and a 40 % increase in the hake fishing power occurred in a decade earlier (SADSTIA, Undated). 
 
Consultation 
The Hake Management Working Group (HMWG) conducted workshops and road-shows65 (See 
Fig. 5.2) to improve the understanding of the need to manage the hake fishing capacity. 
 
Fig. 5.2. Consultation journey taken to develop the HDST effort model (Source: MCM, 2007). 
                                                          
64 See also MCM, 2007b; MCM, 2008   
65 This refers to hake fishery’s sectoral meetings 
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The HDST fishery was identified as a priority fishery during the above consultation, thereby the 
effort model for this fishery was proposed and implemented in 2008. IPOA-capacity principles 
applied during the above consultation include participation, phased implementation, holistic 
approach, conservation, priority, new expertise, mobility and transparency (MCM, 2007c).   
 
Institutions and International Co-operations 
The institutions that facilitated the design of the HDST effort control model are shown in Fig 5.3.  
The HMWG consists of hake fishery’s managers, MCM’s researches and hake right holders. The 








Fig. 5.3. Institutions that facilitated the formulation of HDST effort control model 
 
South Africa has signed the FAO’s CCFR and UNCLOS which oblige states to manage their 
fishing capacity (FAO, 2008).  
 
Administration 
The HDST effort control model reconciles the effort of the vessel with the quota it is to catch in a 
given fishing season. In this context, the vessel’s effort refers to its shaft horse power66 and the 
number of sea days, it is referred to as horse power sea days hereafter. The principles of the 
model include vessels clustering, vessel prioritization and horse power sea days’ estimation 
including allocation. The fishing master plan is the output of the model (MCM, 2007a).  
 
 
                                                          
66 SADSTIA believes that the ability of a bottom trawler to catch a fish is its shaft’s horse power 
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Vessel Clustering 
The HDST effort control model is cluster based. A cluster refers to a vessel or fleet working 
under unitary operational management and fishing interchangeably on one or more access rights 
either whole or in part. The HDST right holders are organized into 15 operational units (See 
Table 5.1) (MCM, 2007a)67.  
 












Vessel Prioritization  
In each cluster, priorities are assigned to vessels. The vessels given the first priority are given the 
maximum possible sea days before considering vessels with subsequent priorities. Likewise, 
when a vessel intends to operate in multiple periods during the fishing season, the cluster 
manager should assign priorities to those periods. It would be wise to give a higher priority to a 
vessel that can fish as long as possible throughout the fishing season (MCM, 2007a)68.    
 
 Sea Days Allocation 
The number of sea days, equivalent to the quota the vessel is to catch for a given fishing season is 
allocated to each vessel. The total sea days for each vessel is calculated by multiplying the horse 
power of the vessel with the base factor (See Appendix 9) and divide the product into the quota 
that vessel is to catch for a given fishing season (MCM, 2007)69.  
 
                                                          
67 See also MCM, 2007b, MCM, 2007c; SADSTIA, Undated 
68 See also MCM; 2007b;MXM, 2007c 
69 See also MCM, 2007b; MCM, 2007c; MCM, 2007d; MCM, 2008; SADSTIA, Undated 
  
Right Holders 
  Single  Multiple 




(38%) 9 (58%) 
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Examples: For a vessel with 1500 HP, intending to catch 1700 tonnes of quota. The total sea 
days would be: 1700 / (4.81 x 1500) = 235 (MCM, 2007)70. In Fig 5.4., if vessel A with 3000 HP 
is to catch 3000 tonnes of quota, it would be allowed to operate for 207 sea days within the 
fishing season. However, vessel B with 3000 HP as well but intends to catch 1000 tonnes of 






  Fig. 5.4. An example of how horse power sea days allocation  
 
 Subsequent to the allocation of horse power sea dats, the vessels usually fit into one of the 
following categories (MCM, 2007a): 
 
• Vessels that deploy less than the horse power allowance needed to catch their quota. 
• Vessels with excessive engine power for the allocated quota.  
 
If the effort that matches with the quotas for a cluster is greater than the cluster’s actual effort for 
a given season, all vessels are enabled to fish for the full season. If it is less, the sea days for at 
least one vessel get reduced leading to some vessels not to fish in some seasons (MCM, 2007a)71. 
 
Fishing Operational Plan 
The cluster manager is responsible for preparing an operational plan for each cluster which is 
presented to MCM for each fishing season. The plan specifies the right holders in the cluster, the 
amount of quota to be exploited caught and the vessels operating in that cluster including their 
technical details which enable MCM to calculate the adjusted horsepower (See Appendix 11). 
Each cluster manager is provided with the software of the HDST effort control model designed to 
facilitate operational planning and to guide MCM in issuing the permits (MCM, 2007a)72.  
                                                          
70 See also MCM, 2007b; MCM, 2007c; MCM, 2007d; MCM, 2008; SADSTIA, Undated 
71 See also DEAT, 2007b; www.sadstia.co.za 
72 See also MCM, 200b; SADSTIA, Undated 
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Permits Outlining Sea Days 
MCM examines and tests all the fishing plans prior to issuing permits. If the plan is reliable, 
MCM re-run the model and issue permits outlining sea days. If the plan is not reliable, MCM 
amends the plan together with the relevant right holder. If the plan is contradictory, MCM does 
not issue permits until the contradictions get sorted out (MCM, 2007a)73.  
 
The Fishing Master Plan  
MCM compiles a comprehensive master plan from the model (See Appendix 12). The plan sets 
out the projected sea days for each vessel in a cluster including the cluster’s quota.  It facilitates 
monitoring and control and helps to reconcile the effort issued on permits and the quotas held in a 
cluster throughout the fishing season (MCM, 2007a)74.  
 
Monitoring 
The master fishing plan is given to MCM’s Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)’s operations centre 
for the purpose of monitoring the operations. The vessels with shortened season get marked so as 
to render them easily identifiable (MCM, 2007a)75.  
 
5.2.2. The TAC Reduction Regime 
The catches were poor in 2005 due to the overexploitation of the deep water hake. The catch per 
day dropped to 5 tonnes. The hake fishery therefore agreed to reduce hake TAC so as to let the 
stock recover and increase the daily.  Subsequently, the hake TAC reduction regime was 
implemented (See Fig. 2.15) (MCM, 2006-2007)76. 
5.2.3. Implications  
The HDST control model prohibits vessels from fishing beyond the time required to catch the 
cluster’s share of TAC in a given fishing season. It thus controls undesirable fishing practices 
such as high grading. Since, the fishing operators cannot increase their effort in compensation for 
low catches, the hake stocks benefit directly from this model. However, it results to capacity 
under-utilization at both fleet and individual vessel levels in the HDST fishery. The fleet under-
                                                          
73 See also MCM, 200b; SADSTIA, Undated 
74 See also MCM, 200b; SADSTIA, Undated 
75 See also MCM, 200b; SADSTIA, Undated 
76 See also MCM, 2007d; MCM, 2008; MCM, 2008-2009; MCM, 2009 
49 
utilization is caused by vessel’s clustering in addition to vessel’s prioritization. Vessel under-
utilization results from sea days allocation.  
The TAC reduction indirectly leads to capacity under-utilization at both fleet and 
individual levels as well. The fleet under-utilization occurs since the vessels available for a given 
fishing cluster get more than necessary to catch the cluster’s quota each time the TAC is reduced. 
Vessel under-utilization occurs due to automatic reduction in the number of sea days as hake 
TAC get reduced.  
Capacity under-utilization results in high costs and reduces employment in the HDST 
fishery. Nevertheless, it has resulted to the recovery of the deep water hake stock coupled with 
improved Catch per Unit Effort (CPUE). Therefore, both the effort control and TAC reduction 
strategies work in the favour of the state, i.e., to protect the deep water hake but increases 
overcapacity in the industry. The industry has to therefore, devise means to deal with the 
increasing overcapacity that is worsened by the on-going capacity under-utilization.  
 
5.3. Compensatory Measures to Offset Overcapacity 
The fishing companies of the HDST fishery have devised some strategies to compensate for the 
ongoing capacity under-utilization in the fishery. The strategies include more efficient fishing 
operations in addition to strategies to reduce latent capacity. 
 
5.3.1. Fishing Operations 
The ongoing capacity under-utilization has called for more efficient fishing operations in the 
HDST fishery. These include clustering the operations and targeting hake by-catch. For under-
utilized vessels, fishing companies have to adjust the crew’s income with short fishing periods.  
 
Clustering   
Most HDST fishery’s right holders operate in clusters and joint ventures so as to increase the 
efficiency of the fishing process. They combine their quotas and share the profits and costs of 
fishing operations. Clustering however exacerbates the amount of latent capacity as fewer vessels 
are used in contrary to when the fishing companies operate individual. Further, this presumably 
leads to the preference of newer and more efficient vessels over the old and smaller vessels. 
Therefore, the HDST fishery may get even more capital intensive if capacity under-utilization 
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persists for a long period of time. On the other hand, clustering increases the utilization of 
individual vessels left in the fishery.  
 
By-catch Targeting 
Some vessels target hake by-catch at the beginning of the fishing season in order to catch a small 
amount of hake every month and thus extend the fishing operation period. Since, they are not 
allowed to land by-catch that is more than hake, they have to catch at most 50 % of by catch.  
  
 Income and Fishing Operations 
Some fishing companies are looking for strategies to adjust their crew’s income with their 
vessel’s operations. Blue Continent Products fishing company for instance, is currently looking at 
three strategies. The first strategy is to let the vessel operate in eight months and pay the crew for 
the entire fishing season so as not to lose them for the following fishing season. The second 
strategy is to catch the quota in eight months and pay the crew only for eight months but the crew 
would probably not come back in the subsequent fishing season. The last strategy is to catch the 
quota in eight months and pay the crew the full income during eight months and 50 % for the rest 
of the year when the vessel is not operating. Mayibuye fishing company, on the other hand pays 
the crew half of their daily rate when the vessel does not go to sea.  
 
5.3.2. Reducing the Latent Capacity 
Some fishing companies have taken some of their latent capacity vessels out of their premises 
through selling or scrapping. However, since there is always the possibility of returning to 
business, sometime in the future, some companies choose to keep some of their latent capacity 
and bear with its high maintenance including security costs.  
 
Selling  
Selling a vessel is not an easy task in SA due to the following reasons. Firstly, there is no market 
for old vessels in the country and the majority of South African vessels are very old. Secondly, 
there is no company that needs to buy a vessel, unless for direct replacements since the total 
capacity is more than sufficient in almost all SA’s fisheries. Third, the European second hand 
market for vessels has cheaper prices and their vessels are newer than South Africans. In essence, 
vessels are generally very expensive. Thereby, to sell it where there is a low vessels’ demand as 
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in SA, it would have to be sold cheaper so as to attract the buyers and that would not be 
beneficial for the seller.  
 
Scrapping  
Other companies prefer to scrap their latent capacity. There is no economic benefit from 
scrapping though, as the company has to send the vessel to India where most of South African 
vessels get scrapped. Further, scrapping leads to a definite loss of jobs 
 
Switching Operations in between Local Fisheries 
The latent capacity and under-utilized vessels cannot operate in other local fisheries. The reasons 
for that are threefold. First, the issue of overcapacity is mutual in the SA’s fishing industry, hence 
vessels cannot switch operations in between the sectors. Second, it is hard to convert a trawler 
into other types of vessels. Last, hake is the most valuable fish in South Africa. Therefore 
switching from hake to a low valuable fishery would only exacerbate the current situation.  
 
Fishing  in Neighboring Countries 
The majority of Spanish vessels operating in South Africa come from Namibia. Thus, there is no 
space for South African vessels in Namibia. Further, Namibia has sufficient capacity to catch 
their quotas and has no extra quotas. Argentina on the other hand, has very strict entry 
limitations. It is also very expensive to get a license from Argentina. Nonetheless, most SA’s 
vessels are not suitable to fish in foreign countries since they are small and old. 
5.4. Summary 
The HDST effort and the TAC reduction regimes regulate the capacity utilization of the HDST 
fleet. This directly leads to capacity under-utilization which is seen through latent capacity and 
vessel’s under-utilization. This capacity under-utilization leads to reduced employment in 
addition to high costs. The industry is therefore currently devising strategies to offset the costs of 
this capacity under-utilization. However, the deep water hake has recovered due to this capacity 
under-utilization. Hence, the fishing capacity management measures in this fishery work in 
favour of the state, i.e. to protect the deep water hake. It has moved the responsible to deal with 





This study aims at examining overcapacity on the basis of its extent, drivers and managements in 
the South African Hake Deep Sea Trawl (HDST) fishery. The main findings, corresponding to 
this aim are summarized below (See Fig 6.1).  
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Fig. 6.1. The main findings of this thesis: from rights allocation to capacity under-utilization 
 
Overcapacity came into the HDST fishery with the rights allocation. TAC reduction and effort 
regimes limit the utilization of this capacity leading to capacity under-utilization (See Fig. 6.1).  
 
6.2. Signals of Overcapacity  
Overcapacity in the HDST fishery is indicated by the following. (i) The overexploitation of the 
deep water hake in 2005 that resulted to declining catch per unit effort (CPUE) (ii) The ongoing 
capacity under-utilization at fleet and individual vessel’s level. It is unlikely for this capacity 
under-utilization to be corrected when the stock recovers since:  
 
• There is no guarantee that the hake TACs could be set at very high levels  
• The fishery was overcapitalized even before the management-induced capacity under-
utilization commenced 
• The complete recovery of the deep water hake stock may take long time as hakes are 
growers and technological creep could impede the correction of this under-utilization.  
• The recently proclaimed signals of recovery of the deep water hake and improved CPUE 
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In standard economics, the firm’s actual capital stock can be greater or less than the optimal 
capital stock at any point in time, resulting in overcapitalization or under-capitalization (Gréboval 
& Munro, 1999). Relating this to fisheries, the HDST fishery actual fleet would be at point A in 
Fig 6.2.  In contrast, the HDST fleet does not alternate between being under-capitalized and 









Fig. 6.2. Time path of a firm’s optimal stock of capital, representing overcapitalization (A) and 
under-capitalization (B) (Adapted from Gréboval & Munro, 1999: 4). 
 
Dupont et al. (2002)77 affirms that, when the fishery’s fleet is under-utilized it is overcapitalized, 
indicating overcapacity. Since capacity utilization (CU) is a short-term concep, thereby capacity 
under-utilization is a rough indicator of overcapacity (Pascoe, 2004).  Further, the HDST fishery 
is not the only fishery where overcapacity is indicated by capacity under-utilization. Capacity 
under-utilization, indicating overcapacity or excess capacity was found  in  a number of recent 
studies (Asche et al., 2008; Fiina, 2005; Lorenzo et al., 2007; Madau et al., 2010; Maravelias & 
Tsitsika, 2008; Pascoe et al., 2004; Reid et al., 2003; Sigler & Lunsford, 2009; Vestergaard et al., 
2002 and Yu & Yu, 2008).  
6.3. Extent of Overcapacity 
In the HDST fishery, the extent of capacity under-utilization is equivalent to the extent of 
overcapacity as overcapacity is indicated by capacity under-utilization in this fishery. However, 




time. Hence, this study has not quantified the exact extent of capacity under-utilization and 
overcapacity in the HDST fishery. 
 
Nonetheless, Pascoe et al. (2004) states that the extent of overcapacity depends on the 
management goals which determine the optimal capacity in a given fishery.The optimal capacity 
thus determines the quantity of capacity that could be classified as overcapacity. Kjærsgaard puts 
it in this way: ”The preferred degree of overcapacity depends on the preferences or goals of 
involved decision-maker(s)” Kjærsgaard (2010: 8).  
 
In principle, different fisheries management goals typically have different optimal capacity levels 
(See Fig 3.3). Morgan et al. (2007) described the typical goals of the fisheries as follows: 
 
• Biological goal, such as maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
• Social goal, such as providing a social safety net or maximizing employment 
• Economic goal, such as maximum economic yield (MEY) or maximum profits 
 
The extent of overcapacity thus differs with these goals (See section 3.3). To maintain 
employment, for instance overcapacity may be the consequence, thus not considered problematic. 
However, when overcapacity is incompatible with the entire set of management goals, it is 
considered a problematic (Metzner, 2005)78. Pascoe puts it this way: 
 
”From a pure profit-maximizing perspective, overcapacity and capacity under-utilization 
is undesirable as the capital could possibly generate a rent elsewhere in the economy. 
However, in a socio-economic perspective where multiple conflicting objectives are quite 
often addressed, overcapacity may not be completely undesirable. For example, in rural 
areas maintaining employment levels or ensuring sustainable production may be more 
important in a fishery than profit maximizing’’ (Pascoe, 2004: 54).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
77 See also Gréboval & Munro, 1999; Kjærsgaard, 2010; Kirkley et al., 1999; Kirkley & Squires, 2004; Lindebo et 
al., 2006; Pascoe & Gréboval, 2003; Pascoe, 2004 Vestergaard et al., 2002  
78 See also Kirkley & Squires, 2004; Pascoe et al., 2004,  
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This reveals that different stakeholders involved in fisheries have different interests and needs 
which often lead to conflicting goals. In practice, the optimal fishing capacity should consider all 
of the above goals. Further, these goals are not independent of each other, and hence it is difficult 
to isolate them. However, there is practically no ideal capacity that could be applied for all of the 
above goals (Morgan et al., 2007). In any case, Kjærsgaard (2010) affirms that optimal allowance 
of fishing inputs may not correspond to a scenario with no overcapacity.  
 
The findings of this study are in agreement with what is said above with regard to conflicting 
optimal capacity levels and extent of overcapacity. The capacity under-utilization leads to job 
losses in the HDST fishery. However, increasing fishing access is one of the goals of South 
African fisheries. Therefore, in a social perspective, the aforesaid capacity under-utilization is not 
desired in the HDST fishery. However, for the sustainability of the deep water hake stock and 
economic efficiency of the entire fishery, capacity under-utilization is desired. In short, in 
multiple goals’ fisheries like the HDST fishery, it is difficult to determine the optimal capacity 
and therefore the extent of overcapacity as the multiple goal context leads to different optimal 
fishing capacity levels for different stakeholders involved in fisheries. In economic and biological 
perspectives, the HDST fishery’s fleet is larger than optimal. However, in social terms it is less 
than optimal as employment continues being reduced.  
6.4. Drivers of Overcapacity 
The capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery is mainly due to management decisions in 
addition to market conditions and technological creep. Pascoe et al (2003)79 lists management 
and market constraints as general drivers of capacity under-utilization.  
 
6.4.1 Market-Induced Capacity Under-utilization 
This is usually due to a temporary increase in fish or fuel prices (Pascoe et al., 2003). It is, 
however, not of major concern in the fisheries management realm as each fisher is believed to be 
operating in a rational way. It usually self-corrects when prices get back to normal. Further, the 
vessels which cannot operate under such market conditions may leave the fishery (Bayliff, 
                                                          
79 See also Kirkley & Squires, 2004; Pascoe et al.,2004; Pascoe, 2004; Metzner, 2005; Sabatella & Piccinetti, 2004;   
   Vestergaard et al., 2002 
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2005)80. Since, the prices do not take too long to get back to normal, the market-induced capacity 
under-utilization that occurred due to high fuel prices in 2008 (See Fig 4.11) in the HDST fishery 
has most probably been corrected in 2009 when the fuel prices went down.   
 
6.4.2. Management-Induced Capacity Under-utilization 
The management-induced capacity under-utilization is typically due to stock recovery programs 
and restrictions on days at sea (as in HDST fishery) including seasonal closures (Pascoe et al., 
2003). It usually calls for more effective management of fishing capacity (Pascoe et al., 2003).   
 
The Fishing Rights Allocation Process  
Incorporating investments in the criteria for the recent allocation of fishing rights in the South 
African fishing industry induced the following:  
 
‘‘Preceding the allocation of fishing rights, in addition to upgrading already operating 
equipments on land and sea, investing in new fishing equipments, and major maintenance 
of existing equipments took place in the South African fishing industry. Subsequently, a 
number of boats were tied up. Boat builders were recommended to start looking hard in 
other directions for income production’’ (Fishing News, June 2006: 3).  
 
Increasing fishing access for HDIs was the main aim of allocation of the fishing rights. It brought 
the persisting overcapacity in the HDST fishery. This concurs with what is said below: 
 
“Removing historical access restrictions in Chile (1978) and granting of improved access 
rights for private entrepreneurs in Mexico and Peru allowed additional fishing  effort to 
enter the fisheries leading to overcapitalization’’ ( Ibarra et al., 2000: 600).  
 
The TAC Reduction and Effort Control Strategies 
These strategies exacerbate the overcapacity that was brought during the recent fishing rights by 
restricting its utilization. Therefore, overcapacity was brought into the HDST fishery by the 
management of the fishery itself and it is currently increasing automatically due to management-
induced capacity under-utilization. This is not the only fishery the where the fishing capacity 
management measures exacerbates overcapacity.  In China, for example effort controls based on 
                                                          
80 See also Metzner, 2005; Pascoe et al.,2003; Pascoe, 2004; Sabatella & Piccinetti, 2004 
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vessel’s licensing and engine power including gear restrictions exacerbated overcapacity. The 
Chinese fishers responded to these effort controls by ‘capital stuffing’ (Yu & Yu, 2008). The 
closing of seasons, termed summer moratorium, led to a ‘race to fish’.  
‘‘After the mid-summer moratorium, fishing gets  more intense as fishers try to catch as much as 
possible in the shortest time possibly, using as more efficient fishing gears ’’(ibid: 356). Even 
when the Chinese government implemented what they termed a double control (restrictions on 
horse power and the number of vessels) replacing a single control (horse power only), the country 
did not achieve its target fishing capacity. This led (Yu & Yu, 2008) to conclude that the 
effective capacity management is practical hardly successful due to the multi-dimensional nature 
of the fishing capacity concept and the fact that overcapacity may arise from a growing number 
of people fishing for their livelihoods.  
 
6.4.3. Technological Creep  
Technological creep, indicated by a slight increase in the average vessel’s engine power (See Fig. 
4.10) contributes to the ongoing capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery. However, the 
HDST right holders overlook this technological creep, as they claim that they have not upgraded 
their fishing equipment since 2005. The minor fixing and panel beating that these right holders 
may have regularly taken their fishing equipment to could have led to the technological creep 
observed in this fishery. The fact that the fishers are technologically friendly as described by 
Tjemelnd (1993) cited in Standal (2005:255) can make them take for granted the technological 
improvements they make on their fishing equipments.  
 
The Norwegian fleet, which is still snared in the web of overcapacity in spite of reductions in the 
number of fishers including vessels, gives a good example of the effects of technological 
improvements in fisheries (Standal, 2005). Through technological modernization, the fishers left 
operating in most Norwegian fisheries have replaced the  excluded vessels with big, more 
powerful and effective vessels. Among others, the development of modern stern trawling, 
automatic hauling of purse seiners and automatic baiting in line fishing reveal the recent 
technological innovations (Standal, 2005). Technological creep and capital stuffing are what have 
been impeding the success of the Chinese fishing capacity management efforts. In this regard, 
even if the management regulations freeze the fleet size or the engine power, technological creep 
still increase the ability of vessels and gears to fish more (Yu & Yu, 2008).  
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6.5. Impacts of Overcapacity 
Capacity under-utilization has incurred high costs in addition to high unemployment in the HDST 
fishery. However, capacity under-utilization has also led to the recovery of the deep water hake 
in addition to improved CPUE (See Fig 4.13).  This concurs with what is affirmed below: 
 
‘‘From a pure stock conservation’s perspective, the existence of management induced 
capacity under-utilization does not impose any threat provided the total output of the 
fishery is constrained to a sustainable level (e.g. through TAC). However, the existence of 
under-utilized capacity creates a number of socio-economic problems, some of which may 
have implications for the success of conservation measures’’ Pascoe (2004:54). 
  
Capacity under-utilization at an aggregate fishery scale is a waste as the same catch could be 
taken with fewer but fully utilized vessels (Pascoe, 2004).  
In contrast to fisheries, capacity under-utilization in ordinary industrial firms is helpful as 
it makes the firm flexible when its products’ demand increases. It also helps the firm to diversify 
its products so as to remain competitive in the market (Sahoo & Tone, 2009).  
6.5.1. Socio-economic Impacts 
The latent capacity has resulted in a permanent loss of jobs in the HDST fishery, with some of 
the employees left in the fishery experiencing reduced income. Inability to sell and non-beneficial 
scrapping of the latent capacity worsen the costs of latent capacity in this fishery.   
 
Employment 
The social impacts of capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery were described as follows:   
 
‘‘Crew members often move in and out of the fishery to coincide with shortened fishing 
seasons. The fishing companies are forced to consider looking at how they can devise 
ways of retaining jobs as vessels are continuously being tied up in harbours. Union 
officials Seem to have no idea of the economic realities of the factors facing the industry, 
and continue promising their members unrealistic wage scenarios which the industry 
finds impossible to meet (Fishing News, February, 2009: 10).  
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Loss of employment and reduced income in fisheries is described by Béné et al. (2010) as push 
factors with pull factors being the availability of work and higher salaries in other sectors. The 
loss of employment and low income due to capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery are 
push factors. The pull factors might have helped some the crew members who worked for under-
utilized vessels. Some of may have stayed in the fishery and put up with reduced income due to 
the absence of pull factors.  
 
Kjærsgaard (2010) concluded that as employment is maximized in a fishery, overcapacity 
also increases. For example, the entire Danish fleet had to stay active if the employment had to be 
maximized (Kjærsgaard, 2010). This corresponds  with what is observed in the HDST fishery 
with regard to employment and capacity utilization. The number of employees are decreasing as 
the capacity continue being under-utilized.  
 
Costs and Profits 
The increased operation costs due to capacity under-utilization automatically decreased the 
profits of the HDST fishery. Pascoe (2004) confirms that the existence of capacity under-
utilization in a fishery induces direct costs on fisheries through forgone economic profits’’ The 
World Bank (2009) substantiate that overcapacity decreases the fisheries profits (See table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1. Rents losses in five major fisheries  
Fishery Year Harvest (1000 tonnes) Revenues Rents loss  
Vietnam, Gulf of Tonkin demersal multigear 2006 235 178 29 
Iceland cod multigear 2005 215 775 55 
Namibian hake trawl 2002 156 69 136 
Peru anchoveta purse seine 2006 5,800 562 29 
Bangladesh hilsa multigear 2005 99 199 58 
Source: World Bank (2009:43). 
 
The rent loses due to overcapacity are not confined in the fisheries of the developing world 
(Asche et al., 2008). Overcapacity induced loss of potential rents in some developed world 





Table 6.2. Potential rents in five European fishing nations.  
Country Potential rents as % of 
landed value 
% reduction in the fleet 
required to achieve this level of 
rent 
Norway 61 65 
Iceland 51 50 
Sweden 30 50 
Denmark 22 67 
UK 32 79 
Source: Asche et al., 2008: 926 
 
From the above, it is clear that overcapacity leads to loss of economic rent and likewise, the 
HDST fishery’s profits are going down due to the persisting overcapacity.  
 
6.6. Compensatory Measures 
The compensatory measures that the HDST fishing right holders take to counter capacity under-
utilization include operating in clusters, targeting by-catch, adjusting the crew’s income with 
shortened fishing seasons and reducing the latent capacity (See section 5.4).   
 
Clustering  
Operating in clusters increases the utilization of the individual vessels that are left in the fishery. 
However, it exacerbates the fleet under-utilization as it leads to fewer operating vessels leading to 
more labour under-utilization. Further, operating in clusters leads to the preference of powerful 
and bigger boats. The small and older vessels which the clusters are not likely to prefer 
continuously add to latent capacity. This clustering seems to be making the HDST fishery more 
efficient in economic terms, i.e., it gears the HDST fishery towards the direction of maximizing 
the profit. In the future, this fishery will be left with only large and more powerful vessels. This 
implies that labour will continue being reduced as the capacity under-utilization in particular of 
the small and old vessels which require much labour continue to persist. This relates to the capital 
intensive nature of industrial fisheries. Therefore, the current notion of overcapacity in this 
fishery, i.e., ‘too many boats chasing too few fish’ is likely to get replaced by the notion ‘fewer 
but big and more powerful boats’ in the future. .  
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It is confirmed by Asche et al. (2008) that moving towards rent generation, requires substantial 
reductions in capacity and employment in the fishery. Futher, below is an example of profit 
maximization scenario that led to capacity under-utilization : 
 
‘‘The Bering Sea Pollock Conservation Cooperative created the incentives to generate 
substantial additional rents. This was done by removing the less efficient vessels and 
extending the fishing season’’ (The World Bank, 2009:45).  
 
The bove example relates to the HDST fishery’s step towards improving efficiency of the fishing 
operations by clustering and extending the fishing season through by-catch targeting. Increasing 
economic efficiency at the expense of employment is no surprise. Employment and profit always 
counter each other (Morgan et al., 2007) 81, thus cannot be maximized simultaneously in a given 












Fig. 6.3. Tradeoffs between profit and employment (Source: Kjærsgaard, 2010: 7) 
 
Fig 6.3 can be used to clarify and quantify tradeoffs between profits and employment through 
decision making. This Figure could tell how much the fishery managers are willing to reduce 
employment by A to achieve B profit. Moreover, Kjærsgaard (2010) affirms that 42 % of the 
vessels and 36 % of the employees in the Danish fleet would have to leave the fishery if the profit 
                                                          
81 See also Kjærsgaard, 2010; Metzner, 2005; Pascoe et al., 2004 
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has to be maximized in the fishery. This relates to the following: ‘‘In the Northern Atlantic the 
path to economic efficiency has been concentrating on technical modernization and capital 
investment on behalf of employment’’ Johnsen (2005:492). 
 
It is clear from the above examples that profit maximization takes place at the expense of 
employment in the fisheries. However, in nations where there are pull factor for the people who 
lose employment in fisheries, it is easy to maximize profits, in contrast to the HDST fishery. 
Below is an example:  
 
‘‘In Norway, the capture fishery, which initially served as a labour buffer in early 20th  
century, was later changed into a rent-extracting sector, especially from 1980s onwards. 
This did not create serious problems in terms of employment, because substantial growth 
that was taking place conjointly in other economic sectors’’ (Béné et al., 2010: 336).  
 
In fisheries where the pull factors are barely available, as in most of developing world fisheries, 
fisheries managers are forced to let the fisheries and in particular the small-scale fisheries, to 
remain as a labour buffer. Hence, such fisheries would not be able to move towards rent 
extraction as that direction contradicts with being a labour buffer (Béné et al., 2010).  
 
6.7. Sustainability  
The biological impacts of capacity under-utilization in the HDST fishery are positive whereas its 
socio-economic impacts are negative. This contradicts with the main goal of the Marine Living 
Resource Act of 1998 (MLRA) to provide for sustainable utilization of marine living resources. 
The FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCFR), (1995) confirms sustainable 
resource management as an important goal in most fisheries. Charles (2001)82 traditionally 
defines sustainability as a balance between economic, ecological and social related goals.  Kay & 
Alder (2005) refers to the above notion of sustainability as the ‘triple bottom line’. However, a 
more advanced definition of sustainability incorporates the trade-offs found in an attempt to 
simultaneously achieve these goals, the political dimension of the process and the long-term 
balance among them (See Fig 6.4). 
                                                          
82 See also Kay & Alder, 2005; Utne, 2008 
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Technology and economy domain 
Managererialism, Strategic planning, 
integrated policy structures and 
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Fig. 6.4. Sustainability domains: a balanced ‘triple bottom line’ (Source: Kay & Alder, 2008: 15). 
 
In a fisheries perspective, the ecological sustainability means the capability to maintain 
sustainable harvest, the target fish base, related and affected species and the resilience of the 
entire ecosystem where the target species lives. The economic sustainability refers to the 
capability to maintain economic welfare of the fishery with its economic viability. The social 
sustainability implies maintaining socio-cultural wellbeing of the fishery including the health of 
the human system, or as phrased by Charles: ‘‘A sustainable fishery simultaneously maintains the 
integrity of the marine ecosystem, supports the fishing communities and maintains the economic 
viability of the fishing sector on a long-term basis” (Charles, 2001: 111).  
 
From the above definition it is clear that sustainability is not only about environment (fish) or 
economy (profit), as it seems in the HDST fishery. Sustainability as a concept is vague and 
complex as Utne (2008) concurs, thereby, when considering sustainability, conflicting situation 
usually occur. The vagueness and complexity of sustainability is what led to a conflicting 
situation in the HDST fishery, in an attempt to balance the‘triple bottom line’.  
 
            In short, employment as part of sustainability is not being prioritized in the HDST fishery. 
The managers support the ecological domain of sustainability while the fishers are concerned 
with the economic sustainability. This is in accord with Utne (2008) who states that overcapacity 
threatens sustainability. The strides to balance the ‘triple bottom line’ phenomena of 
Legal & Institutional domain 
Managererialism, Strategic 
planning, integrated policy 
structures and regulations 
Cultural and social domain 
Intrinsic rights, civil rights, 
empowerment & direct action  
TRANSITION 
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sustainability became practically in impossible in the HDST fishery and rather resulted in a 
conflicting scenario.   
 
6.8. Summary 
The HDST fishery is facing substantial overcapacity, particularly in economic terms. This is 
observed through capacity under-utilization which inflicts direct costs to the entire industry 
through forgone economic profits. In a social perspective, is reduces the employment in addition 
to low income for some employees. However, it relatively recovered the deep water hake stock. 
Maximizing the profit is attempted through operating in clusters, leading to more capacity and 
labour under-utilization.  This profit maximization seem to be replacing the current notion of 
overcapacity, i.e., ‘too many boats facing too few fish’ with that of ‘few but big and more 
powerful boats’ which is more prevalent in the developed world’s fisheries.  
In contrast to many developed world fishing nations, the issue of overcapacity has rather 
become the industry’s responsibility in the HDST fishery. However, in other countries, for 
example Norway (Hersoug, 2005) and Taiwan (Huang & Chuang, 2009) overcapacity is the 
responsibility of both the state and the industry. In Norway, the state pays 50 % for scrapping the 
vessels and the industry pays 50 % (Hersoug, 2005). In countries where there are vessel buyback 
schemes, as for example in, Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, European Community and 
Taiwan (Metzner, 2005), overcapacity is entirely considered a state’s responsibility .  













7. Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Research  
 
7.1. Introduction 
Guided by the research questions, this study looked at overcapacity in the South African Hake 
Deep Sea Trawl (HDST) fishery. The research questions that this study dealt with are as follows: 
 
1. What is overcapacity, how is it defined in technical, biological and economic terms? 
2. To what extent is there overcapacity in the HDST fishery? 
3. What are the main factors driving capacity to the current level in this fishery? 
4. What are the measures used to manage this capacity and what are their implications? 
 
7.2. Conclusions 
The conclusions drawn from the findings of the present study, corresponding to the above 
research questions are as follows.   
 
7.2.1. What is overcapacity?  
The perception of what constitutes fishing capacity varies considerable among stakeholders 
involved in the fisheries due to interests and needs stemming from their unique relationships with 
fisheries. These different perspectives lead to various optimal fishing capacity levels and thereby 
overcapacity for a given fishery. To economists, the fishing capacity necessary to achieve 
Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) is considered optimal. To biologists, a fishing capacity that 
does not fish beyond the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is considered optimal. To social 
scientists, the fishing capacity that achieves open access equilibrium, where employment is 
maximized would be optimal. To technologists, a full utilization of fishing inputs implies optimal 
fishing capacity. Hence, there is no universal optimal fishing capacity that would satisfy all of the 
stakeholders, i.e., an optimal fishing capacity that would simultaneously maximize the profit, 
yield and employment with all fully utilized inputs in a given fishery. Hence, the perception of 
overcapacity, determined by the above optimal capacity levels differs among these stakeholders.  
 
7.2.2. To what extent is there overcapacity in the HDST fishery? 
The overcapacity in the HDST fishery can be described as ‘‘too many boats chasing too few 
fish’’. However, this will apparently turn into ‘‘fewer but bigger and more powerful boats’’ if 
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capacity under-utilization persist for a long time. In economic terms, there is considerable 
overcapacity in the HDST fishery due to capacity under-utilization.  In biological terms the 
capacity in this fishery is reduced through capacity utilization restrictions which resulted in the 
recovery of the deep water hake (the mainstay of the HDST fishery) and improved Catch per Unit 
Effort (CPUE). In social terms, an inadequate capacity occurs in the HDST fishery as the 
employees continue losing jobs due to capacity under-utilization.  
 
7.2.3. What are the drivers of overcapacity? 
Overcapacity came into the HDST fishery with the rights allocation. TAC reduction and effort 
regimes limit the utilization of this capacity leading to capacity under-utilization. Technological 
creeps continue making the fishing capacity more efficient, leading to more capacity under-
utilization. Market-induced capacity under-utilization occasionally occurs in this fishery.  
 
7.2.4. What are the management measures and their implications?  
The utilization of the fishing capacity in the HDST fishery is managed through effort control and 
TAC reduction strategies. From the state’s perspective, this management strategy is working as 
the deep water hake is recovering. However, from the industry’s perspective this management 
strategy has led to capacity under-utilization resulting in high costs, low profits, job looses and 
low income for some employees. Therefore, the above management works in favour of the state 
authorities and has moved the overcapacity and the responsibility to deal with it to the industry. 
 
7.3. Recommendations  
The fishing capacity management measures are dissected into incentive blocking and incentive 
adjusting measures (See Appendix 14). The former try to block economic motives that induce 
fishers to increase fishing capacity, thus impeding fishing capacity’s growth rate. The latter 
modifies these motives by creating economic forces that can reduce overcapacity (Cunningham 
& Gréboval, 2001)83. The incentive blocking measures often worsen overcapacity, hence Metzner 
(2005) refers to them as the ‘recipe for economic waste’. Though overcapacity ultimately get 
reduced under the incentive adjusting scenario, hard choices still need to be made, particularly if 
sustainable utilization is among the goals of the fishery as in the HDST fishery (See Fig 7.1).  
                                                          
83 See also Gréboval et al., 1999; Gréboval, 2004; Huang & Chuang, 2009; Metzner & Ward, 2002;  Metzner, 2005; 









Fig.  7.1. The transitional considerations associated with the development and implementation of 
effective capacity management measures (Pascoe et al., 2008: 59) (See also Appendix 13).  
 
In countries like South Africa, where there are no compensation for those who loose jobs in the  
fisheries, the incentive adjusting methods would exacerbate labour under-utilization. Considering 
the lack of universal optimal capacity for all fisheries’ stakeholders and that there is no ‘‘one size 
fits all approach’’, it is hard to determine what management measures could be practically 
effective for the HDST fishery. Nevertheless, this study recommends the following adjustments 
in the HDST fishery’s management system so as to ameliorate the under-way impacts of the 
capacity under-utilization that is ongoing in this fishery.  
 
The use of group or community quotas (See Appendix 11) in addition to the ongoing 
management measures. In this regard, the hake TAC would be set and allocated to the sectors of 
the hake fishery as usual. The HDST fishery’s share of TAC would be allocated into two groups, 
namely the South African Deep-Sea Trawling Industry Association (SADSTIA) and the 
Association of Small Hake Quota Industries (ASHQI). Noteworthy, SADSTIA comprises 
established companies and these companies are currently stuck with the latent capacity brought 
by fleet under-utilization. ASHQI comprises of small-quota holders with no capacity and 
operating co-operatively with established companies in addition to joint ventures with Spanish 
vessels.  The hypothesized results of the proposed group quotas are as follows:  
 
• Division of the fishery into small-scale (ASHQI) and a large-scale (SADSTIA) sectors. 
• SADSTIA could open up a second hand market for the latent capacity and through loan 
funds from private organizations, ASHQI  could buy these vessels. 
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• Consequently, ASHQI would maintain the labour of this fishery by employing the old and 
small labour demanding latent vessels from SADSTIA. 
• Further, ASHQI would be increasing value adding into the hake processing sector as the 
majority of these said old vessels are wet-fish vessels. Further, value adding would 
increase the employment and profit (if they could export the value added fish products). 
• SADSTIA, on the other hand would be maintaining the capital intensive nature of this 
fishery by continuing to enhance the fishing efficiency leading to more capacity under-
utilization at fleet level but increasing the utilization of vessels left in the fishery. 
• Both groups could retain their crew members for under-utilized vessels by using them for 
maintenance and security of these vessels.  
• In aggregate, the HDST fishery would be ameliorating the impacts of capacity under-
utilization by increasing or maintaining the current employment levels through the small-
scale sector (ASHQI) while maximizing the profit through the large-scale sector 
(SADSTIA). Further, the sustainability of the target stock would be maintained by the 
TAC which is set based on the biomass of the stock.  
• In short, by implementing the proposed strategy, the HDST fishery would be attempting 
to balance the ‘triple bottom line’ notion of sustainability.  
 
Moreover, the following would perhaps compliment the proposed strategy.  First, proper 
definition of fishing capacity by stakeholders involved in decision making. This would correct 
the linear perspective on fishing capacity, endemic in most fisheries that instead exacerbate 
overcapacity. Second, stressing the fact that different stakeholders have different optimal fishing 
capacity levels and there is no universal optimal capacity for all these stakeholders.  Third, 
implement education and awareness programs to make the affected stakeholders understand the 
impacts of managing over capacity, including limitations and hard choices that have to be made. 
Fourth, regular monitoring and evaluation of the management as new information and data get 
available, i.e., implementing adaptive management. Lastly, understanding the principles of the 
the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries management (EAF) would help the HDST fishery 




7.4. Further Research  
The following might have made this study to miss some knowledge with regard to overcapacity 
in the HDST fishery. First, the exact extent of overcapacity in the HDST fishery could not be 
quantified due to inability to quantify the under-utilization of each vessel. Second, market 
induced capacity under-utilization could also not be quantified due to data deficiency. Third, this 
study has been largely based on secondary data for an input-based measure of capacity. Fourth, 
for a subjective measure of capacity, only five fishing operation managers were interviewed.  
Last, this study only examined the fishing capacity, processing capacity has been left out. Hence, 
to improve knowledge about overcapacity in the HDST fishery, further research may consider: 
 
• Assessing  the exact capacity under-utilization  
• Use  primary quantitative data  instead of the secondary  data 
• Use  input-based, subjective and output-based measures of capacity 
• For the subjective measure, select a bigger sample size 
• Finally, assess the processing capacity as well  
Additionally, further research can also simulate the impact of the proposed management 
adjustments using for example,  a model which was developed by Santos (20??) for a fishery 
ecology course to simulate industrial and artisanal fisheries in Mozambique. This model tests the 
impact of different input controls in the fisheries and use indicators, i.e., yield or profit to check 
their effectiveness. In this context, the artisanal fishery would be the vessel owners organized 
through ASHQI and the industrial fishery would be the ones organized in the SADSTIA. The 
researcher could use yield, profits and employment levels as indicators of effectiveness of 
simulated management measures. Further, this model could be manipulated so as to simulate the 
impact of the proposed group quotas on the chosen indicators.  
 
Obviously, this is only a case study. Hence, more into depth research is needed to 
improve knowledge concerning overcapacity in the HDST fishery. Hopefully more 
 in-depth research could produce data to ameliorate the current fishing management measures in 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire used for the subjective assessment 
Fisheries Transformation 
In terms of capacity and investments, how do you think the industry transformed from the medium to the 
long term rights allocation management process? 
Fishing Capacity  
1. Do you understand the concept of overcapacity? 
2. If yes, what measures do you put in place to ensure it does not occur in your company? 
3. If no, would you be interested if MCM organizes a workshop to explain the concept? 
4. How many vessels operating in your company since 1998?  
5. Any developments made in fishing vessels, gears and fishing strategies in this company since 1998?  
6. How has the development referred to above impacted effort? 
a. Any improvement in CPUE since these developments? 
b. If yes, what are the likely causes, technological creep? Improvements in stock size? 
c. Are other companies experiencing the same trends as your company?  
d. How have this change affected profits? 
e. How are the general costs of production? 
7. How has economy affected you fleet or fishing capacity? 
Management 
8. What impacts does effort control have on crew, exports, revenues, costs and investments? 
a. How have the situation been before implementation of effort controls? 
9. Have changes in fleet size affected changes in income of employees? 
10. How do employees and crew compensate for changes brought by effort control? 
11. How do other right holders compensate for such changes? 
12. Are there other alternatives for vessels and crew? 
a. If so what do vessels and crew do when they have not gone to sea? 
b. Do vessels go participate in other sectors? 
c. Do they go fish in foreign countries? 
13. As a Right Holder, do you frequently sell or purchase new vessels? 
a. If so, why? Is it because you want to build up fleet capacity? 
b. What changes does that bring on the fishery? In terms of effort, catch rates, profits? 
 
Appendix 2: Interviewees and the fishing companies they represented  
Interviewee’s Name Occupation Company name 
Roy Bross Secretary South African Deep-Sea Trawling Industry Association 
Pierre Rocher Fishing operations manager Blue Continent Products fishing company 
Rory Williams Fishing operations manager Viking fishing company 
Suleiman Sallie Fishing operations manager Irvin & Johnson fishing company 
Boya Chettey Fishing operations manager Mayibuye fishing company 
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Appendix 3: The main sectors of the South African fishing industry  
Appendix 4:  Characteristics of the HDST fishery’s fleet for 2009 
Number of vessels  56 
Freezer (Fr), Combined (Com) and Ice vessels (Ice)  21 Fr, 4 Com, 35 Ice 
Average age in years  24.5, with the majority between 20 to 30 
Average Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT)  717 tonnes 
Average (range) length  42 (20 - 72) m 
Average Horse Power  1464 HP 
Average number of sea days  265 
Average catch per sea days (nominal tonnes) 8 to 9  
Adapted from http://www.envirofishafrica.co.za 









Source: MCM, 2005a 
Sector  Description  
Recreational  This includes angling, spear fishing, cast-netting and marine aquarium fishing  
Subsistence  This is based on low catch value, easily accessible and cheap to harvest reSources such as 
oysters, mussels, limpets, winkles, red bait and estuarine crabs. There are about 28,300 
fisher households and 29,200 individual subsistence fishers in South Africa.  
Small-scale  
commercial  
This includes small-scale fishing activities that do not qualify for subsistence criteria. 
Fishers of this sector operate at the lower end of the commercial fishers. Inshore west rock 
lobster, line fish, abalone, octopus, kelp and sea weeds form the basis of this sector.  
Medium-scale 
commercial  
This is based on squid, inshore pelagic, hake long line and hand line, tuna pole, demersal 
shark and offshore west coast rock lobster fishing for local and international markets. 
Large-scale 
commercial 
This is based on hake trawling, offshore pelagic, patagonian tooth fish, south coast rock 
lobster and prawn trawling. ReSources harvested in this sector are hardly accessible, 
fishing thus requires substantial capital and technology. Large vessels and few but strongly 
vertically integrated companies participate in this sector mainly for international markets. 
In addition to transformation, the allocation of the long-term rights was based on the following: 
• Biological consideration  fishing impact on the  target fish, primary done through TAC allocation 
• Ecological consideration impact on the ecosystem of the target species  
• Socio-economic considerationsocio-economic impact of allocations on right holders, workers and 
consumers, prioritizing those dependent of the resource.  
• Commercial considerationsinvestments in fixed assets, fishing, marketing and processing capacity 
• Performance financial and fishing performance, value adding, enterprise development, job creation  
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A fishing permit is required to undertake fishing activity in South African waters & issued 
seasonally with accompanying conditions. In addition, a fish transporting permit is needed for 
transporting the catch from the port where it was landed. Fish export and import permits are also 
needed to export and import fish respectively. An EZZ permit is issued to foreign vessel for landing 
catch in any of the South African ports.  
Vessel license Any vessel that is to operate in South African waters has to possess a vessel license  
Area 
Restriction 
Fishing on bays is generally restricted since they are nursery areas for fish. The HDST fishery is 
restricted to fish in areas shallower than 110 m and within 20 nm from the coats  
Effort 
limitation 
Effort is limited by limiting the number of vessels that go to sea through allocation of fishing days 
to vessels based on their horse power and company’s quota (See chapter 4). Fishers are not to 
exceed  the current level of vessel capacity when replacing old vessels 
Technical Measures 
Mesh size & 
Catch limits 
A codend mesh-size of 110 mm is utilized in HDST fishery with a respective selectivity of at least 
2 years old fish  
Tori lines Tori lines are deployed by HDST fishery’s operators so as to reduce the incidence capturing of 
sea birds and thus their mortality.  
By-catch limits The by-catch in HDST should not exceed 50% of hake caught  
Taxes and Fees 
Permit fees  The permits are not for free, there is a fee that has to be paid in order to get a permit 
ReSource tax Right Holders pay levies for each catch they land based on the quantity of landings. Permit and 
levies funds are used for research, compliance and management. 
Source: MCM, 2008-2009 
 
Appendix 7: Hake TAC species breakdown  





Adapted from http://www.envirofishafrica.co.za 
 
HDST Share = 132720 
M. paradoxus (90%) & 
M. capensis (10%) 
 
89 Right Holders 
79 vessels 
Jobs sustained 8938 





Split between East & West Coasts 
 
132 Right Holders 
64 Vessels 
Jobs sustained1495 
Jobs Per 1000 tonnes of TAC136 
 
HIST Share= 9480 
M. capensis (100%) 
 
17 Right Holders 
31 Vessels 
Job sustained1480 
Jobs Per 1000 tonnes of TAC164 
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Appendix 8: Monitoring, control and surveillance for the Hake fishery  
Source: MCM, 2008-2008 













Logbooks Landings are monitored at factories and company landing facilities and returned with skippers 
logbooks to MCM where catch, effort and quotas are reconciled. Trawlers are required to report 
potential landings within two days  in advance of port arrival. 
Observers For each HDST fishery operation, there should be an observer on board the vessel from MCM, 
responsible for monitoring the fishing activity 
Fishery Control 
Officers (FCOs) 
MCM has for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing management regulations distributed FCOs in 
all harbours where fish are landed to inspect the landings 
Vessel Monitoring 
System(VMS) 
VMS should be attached in each vessel during the period of operation so as to convey information 
with regard to the crew and operations to the MCM’s operational room 
Vessel Patrols Vessel patrols along the country’s EEZ are carried out for surveillance and enforcement 
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Appendix 10: General indicators of overcapacity in fisheries  
 
Source: Lindebo, 200484 
 




This refers to open access or limited access or rights-based management system. Open access 
tend to have high levels of overcapacity as number of participants in the fishery are not restricted. 
Limited access also tend to have overcapacity but not as severe as in open access. Right-based 
fisheries eventually remove overcapacity. 
Biological 
status of a 
stock 
An overfished target species of a fishery may reveal the signals of overcapacity as overcapacity 
and overfishing are likely to occur together. A fishing stock that is fully utilized or almost 
overfished could also show overcapacity as less inputs could be used than before the stock get 
overfished but provide the same level of catch as before. This is a reasonable indicator of 
overcapacity but should be applied carefully. 
Harvest/ 
target 
catch ratio  
Here, overcapacity exists when the harvest levels regularly go beyond the target catch presuming 
that the target capacity is the level necessary to harvest the target catch during a fishing season. 
This is not a perfect overcapacity indicator due to the following; (i) the fishery could be closed 
once the target catch is achieved,(ii) discarding over quota catch could disguise the apparent 
overcapacity and (iii) when a fishery has been overfished, the harvest may be below the target, 
especially if the target is set high for social motives 
TAC/seaso
n length  
Here, overcapacity could be indicated by the ratio between TAC and the season length. This is 
not a perfect capacity measure either, due to the same reasons as for harvest and target catch ratio. 
Manageme
nt conflicts 
Controversies relating to the setting of TAC and allocation among user groups and fishery 
managers may indicate signals of overcapacity. However, due to inability to evaluate the 
seriousness of such controversies, this is considered a rough measure of overcapacity.  
Latent 
permits  
This refers to fishing permits that have never or formerly been used but currently not active in the 
fishery. Overcapacity could occur when there are many latent permits or low ratio of active 
permits to total permits in a fishery. This may lead to overestimation of capacity since fishers 
may lease their permits (if transferable) thus get cancelled from the management system. 
Catch per 
unit effort 
When TACs and harvest levels are constant, a decline in catch per unit effort implies overfishing 
and possibly overcapacity. This is not a perfect measure as catch per unit effort can remain stable 
even when overcapacity exists in a fishery if TAC increases with the stock recover. 
Value per 
unit effort  
Value per unit effort decreases as the quantity of catch declines indicating overfishing and thus 
overcapacity.  Value per unit effort may however decline due to other reasons even if catches 
rates are increasing, e.g. when juveniles dominated the catches leading to lower prices and 
revenue per trip even if the total catch weight remains constant.  
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Source: MCM, 2007c 
Appendix 12: Master Plan for the HDST fishery’s 2009 fishing season 
Cluster Company 
 
Quota  Vessels 
Fishing Period 
1 Period 2 Manager 
Irvin & Johnson 30716 Bluebell 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Boronia 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Foxglove 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Forest lily 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Fuschia 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Freesia 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Stevia 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Lobelia 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Godetia 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Aloe 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Nerine 01 Jan-31 Dec  














 Sea Harvest  22858 Harvest Belinda    
                                                                                                                                                                                            
84 See also Ward et al., 2004; Ward, Undated 
1. The basic parameter of the HDST effort control system is 0,438 kg hake per corrected horsepower 
per sea day tuned to hake TAC of 150000 tonnes. Tuning works thus, in a year in which the TAC is 
set at 120000 tonnes, the above base factor becomes 0.534 kg per corrected horsepower per day 
2. The second parameter is 265 sea days per year for all classes of vessels 
3. The  factors taken into account for adjusted horsepower are as follows: 
a. The South African Maritime Safety Authority registered vessel’s main engine power  in 
kilowatts or horse power (1 horse power = 0.746 kilowatts),  
b. The kilovolt amp (kva) capacity of power take-off alternators (i.e. alternators coupled to 
the main shaft)  
c. The presence or absence of a kort nozzle.  
4. The power correction to the shaft is calculated as follows:  
a. Up to 30% of main engine power deducted for shaft alternators where the output of the 
alternators adjusted by a conventional kva power factor would be greater than 30% of 
engine power, 
b. When the above is untrue an adjusted kva is deducted from maximum engine capacity and  
c. 18% deduction from maximum engine capacity is allowed for vessels without kort nozzles.  
The correction (comprise above section 4(a) or 4(b) and 4(c) ) is then capped at 20% of engine capacity.  
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Atlantic Trawling 7072 Harvest Bettina   
Vuna Fishing 2128 Harvest Diana 01 Jan- 31 Dec  
  Vuna Elita 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Florita 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Kirstina 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Lindiwe 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Marina   
  Harvest Nandi 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Ramona 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Selina 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Veronica 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Zula   
  Staaltind1 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Krotoa 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Georgina 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Harvest Gavina 01 Jan-31 Dec  





































Viking Fishing  2013 Andromeda 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Algo Mar  353 Armana 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Hangberg  1621 Lucerne 01 Jan-31 Dec  
New South African  1015 Lezandi 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Quayside Fish Suppliers  465 African Queen 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Selecta Sea  Products  467 Svein Jonsson 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Sistro Trawling  567 Vera Marine 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Siyaloba  396 Lincoln 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Saco  1674 Maretje 31 Jan-15 Jun 15 Jul-31 Dec 
Eyethu  1638 Khulisa Eyethu 25 Feb-31 Oct  
J&J Visserye Bk 407 Lepanto 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Ziyabuya  1187 Sistro 01 Jan-31 Dec  




















Foodcorp  4766 Beatrice  Marine 01 Jan-31 Dec  
  Maria Marine 01 Jan-31 Dec  
Foodcorp   Isabella Marine 01 Jan-31 Dec  
 
John Pope  
 
Fernpar Fishing 1311 Toralla 28 Jan-31 Dec  
Hoxies 432 Sandile 21 Jan-31 Dec  
Community Workers 421 Marie Claire 21 Jan-31 Dec  
Radaco Sea Products 290    
Bato Star 857    
Algoa Bay Sea Products 363    
Eigelaars Bote 133    
















Usuthu Fishing 628 Codesa I 21 Jan-31 Dec  
Rainbow Nation  389 Okombahe 21 Jan-31 Dec  
Impala Fishing 475    
Umoya Fish Processors 113    
Lorcom Thirteen 100    
Blue Continent Products 697 Compas Chalenger 21 Jan-31 Dec  
Calamari  392 Realeka 21 Jan-31 Dec  
Bhana Coastal Fishing 448    
Surmon Fishing 796    
Azanian Fishing 234    












 BP Marine Fish Products 240    
 
Michael Sands  
Combined fishing 594 Portunity 15 Jan-31 Dec  
NVO 1163 Esra Cruz 15 Jan-31 Dec  
Snoek wholesalers 396 Millenium 01 Mar-31 Dec  
United  
Fishing Cluster 
 DMA Fishing 1804 Antares Prima 01 Mar-31 Dec  
Andrew Kaye  
 
Offshore  Offshore  1809 Eyodidi 01 Feb-31 Dec  Bill Symmonds  
 1166 Basani 01 Jan-31 Dec  ZMW  
Viscor Visko Seeproducts   355    Dave Japp 
Ramsauer Dyer Eiland Visserye 115,983 Boetie Bert 23 Jan- 27 Jun  Lorraine Dyer 
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EFH Walters 153,901    
Usuthu Fishing  628 Codesa I 28 Feb-31 Dec  
Rainbow Nation  389    




 Umoya Fish Processors 50     
Mayibuye  1704 Echalar 01 Mar-14 Jun 10 Aug-31 Dec 
Khoi Qwa 122    Mayibuye 
 Tradeforth 112     
Adapted from MCM, 2007c 
Appendix 13: Fisheries management tools and effect(s) on overcapacity 
 


























Source: General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean Commission, 2010 
 
Awareness and recognition – and the difficult balance between capacity and long term problems of 
overcapacity as well as the long-time acquiring of  benefits capacity reduction programs 
Balances of power and distributional issues – and how these may occur within fleets, between various 
parts of fleets, as well as between different stakeholder groups; 
Development – and how coastal states have the right to fish and how this may affect having fishing vessels, ; 
Displacement – and the movement and impacts of fishers when capacity is shifted out of one fishery; 
Employment – and using fisheries as an alternative livelihood of last resort; 
Financing – and who should pay for capacity reduction programs and of how good financial conditions may 
inhibit stakeholders’ interest in undertaking capacity reduction strategies even when overcapacity exists. 
Food security – and using fisheries as food source of last resort; 
Globalization – and how market forces are reaching further and creating new incentives and pressures on 
previously isolated resources before local societies are prepared to deal with these forces; market forces, 
technological change and innovation, predicting change and continuous adaptation, 
Governance and institutions - and how informal systems may perform better but have less formal 
legitimacy than official processes and how different stakeholder groups may make use of existing 
institutional arrangements to achieve their particular objectives; 
Information and education – and about the real and perceived outcomes, objectives, and goals that different 
user groups may have; how different cultures may accept or reject capacity reduction programs; 
International cooperation – and the need to share knowledge about efforts to reduce overcapacity; 
Limitations – and the fact capture fisheries are incapable of providing food, employment and income for all; 
Management and management systems – and how existing regulations may influence the fishing behavior, 
and how to harness technology to it increases the fleet’s productivity while supporting capacity reduction; 
Objectives and Perceptions – and how much fish different user groups actually caught versus what they 
should be allowed to catch as well as the disputes that conflicting objectives may create; 
Politics – and how management decisions may be influenced or changed by politics; 
Range of a fishery and the numbers of participants – and how potentially enormous numbers of 
participants who may be individually operating at low levels but having significant cumulative impacts; and 
Serendipity and Total Chance – and how the adoption of capacity reduction programs may simply depend 
on a combination of factors that cannot be controlled or predicted. 
